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THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT OF COURT*

Ronald Goldfarbt

l.

INTRODUCTION

contempt power of American courts is as old as our judiciary itself and, while derived from historical common-law
practices, is peculiar both to and within American law. It is peculiar to American law in that other legal systems (not based on the
English) have no such power of the nature or proportions of ours.1
It is peculiar within our system in that no other of our legal powers
is comparable to contempt in pervasiveness or indefiniteness. Nor
does any analogy come to mind of a legal power with the inherent
constitutional anomalies characteristic of contempt. The contempt
power of American courts is truly "sui generis," to adopt a favorite
cliche of our judiciary.
Few legal devices find conflict within the lines of our Constitution with the ubiquity of the contempt power. These conflicts
involve issues concerning the governmental power structure su_ch
as the separation of powers and the delicate balancing of federalstate relations. In addition, there are civil rights issues attributable
to the conflict between the use of the contempt power and such
vital procedural protections as the right to trial by jury, freedom
from self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and indictment-to
name only the most recurrent and controversial examples. Aside
from these problems, there are other civil liberties issues, such as
those involving freedom of speech, association, and religion, arising out of the exercise of the contempt power. The purpose of
this article is to present an extensive review of the constitutional
problems provoked by the use of the contempt power by American
courts.2
Most of the constitutional issues concerning the courts' contempt power arise from both its procedural authorization and practical implementation. A brief outline of contempt procedures
should assist the review which follows.

T

HE

• The substance of this article is drawn from a book to be published by the author
entitled THE CONTEMPT PowER. Other articles adapting sections of this book have appeared in 24 MODERN L. REv. 239 (1961); 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1:961); 13 SYRAcusE L.
R.Ev. 44 (1961); and 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.-Ed.
t Member of the California and New York Bars.-Ed.
1 See generally Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. I.
2 Analogous constitutional problems relating to the congressional and administrative
contempt powers will not be discussed in detail in this article.
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While the congressional contempt power is presently governed
by a single clear statute,8 the judicial contempt power is procedurally more intricate, confused, and troublesome. The power of
courts to punish contempts early became a settled precedent in
English common law, though the extent of its application, historically, is open to question. After a brief colonial use of contempt powers, claimed to be inherent in the common law, and
the formal establishment of the power by some state legislatures,
the first federal statute concerning contempt of court was passed
in 1789.4 This statute gave federal courts the discretionary power
to punish contempts as defined by the common law, expressly
covering misconduct of officers of the court, disobedience of process, and misbehavior in the presence of the court. 5 The contemnor was provided with no procedural rights and a judge was
limited in sentencing only by his conscience. This enactment was
followed in 1821 by a second federal statute6 authorizing a summary, virtually unrestricted power, albeit with certain specific
limitations, encompassing the same categories of conduct as the
prior legislation, except that the controversial words "or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" were added
with reference to the offense of misbehavior in the presence of
the court.7 A court's sentencing power is in many ways unlimited,
and the procedures are often summary. Through the years some
fear has been expressed about the unlimited nature of the power.
Though few have advocated abolishing the contempt power itself,
there have been some restrictions in its use by both limiting legislation and judicial interpretation.
The Clayton Act of 19148 included a provision guaranteeing
/ the right to a jury trial in all criminal contempt cases arising out
j of willful disobedience of any lawful writs or orders of the district
courts. Further conditions required that the contemptuous act
1
must be one listed as a federal or state criminal offense in order to
/ fall within this provision, and that direct contempts and contempts
arising out of suits brought by the United States be excluded from
the statute's coverage. These qualifying conditions sobered hopes
that the new law would be labor's Magna Carta by so circumscribs 52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 92. See generally Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 CoLuM. L. REv. 401, 422 (1928).
5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, REv. STAT. §§ 725-26 (1875).
6 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1958).
7 The present statute reads much the same as the 1821 law. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
8 18 u.s.c. § 3691 (1958).
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ing the scope of jury rights as to prevent the useful and available
employment of the jury which it was hoped might be accomplished.9
In the next decade, numerous bills were presented to Congress
calling for liberalization of the harsh summary contempt procedures, and finally in 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act was signed
into law by President Hoover. This statute provided for trial by
jury in indirect contempt cases arising out of labor disputes, and
disqualification of judges personally involved in contempt actions.10
When the Supreme Court ruled that legislation such as this did
not violate the separation of powers doctrine,11 several of the states
followed with similar legislation ameliorating some of their more
stringent contempt procedures. Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure further refined the accompanying procedures
for prosecution of all direct and indirect criminal contempts in
matters of notice and hearing.
In 1957, the Civil Rights Act which was passed included certain I
contempt provisions. 12 This act, the first major federal attempt to
deal with civil rights since post-Civil War times, gave injunctive
protection to voting rights, enforceable through criminal contempt
proceedings. Use of the contempt power was a pivotal issue in passage of the act, providing as it did an effective means for governmental protection of rights already existing but lacking enforceability. Contemptuous misconduct under this statute might arise
out of disobedience to subpoenas issued by the Civil Rights Commission13 or interference with voting rights. 14 The statute grants
contemnors the right to demand a jury trial de novo when their
sentence exceeds 300 dollars or forty-five days' imprisonment.
Otherwise the right to trial by jury is permissive and in the court's
discretion.
The courts have also shown some self-consciousness about the
exercise of the summary contempt power, and at times have limited
some of its harshnesses through judicial interpretation. Though
less direct than legislation, this technique has often been as effective. For example, it has been noted that a strong policy against
judicial control of the press provoked the Supreme Court to interpret the "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of jusSee generally SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CASES (1935).
18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958), formerly the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
11 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 67 (1924).
12 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(e), 1995 (1958).
13 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975d(g) (1958).
14 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958).
9

10
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tice" clause of the federal contempt statute in a way which all but
precludes most constructive contempt convictions.15 This attitude,
the antithesis of the English treatment, results probably as much
from distaste for summary procedures as from attitudes about the
contempt power itself. Another example of judicial conservatism
with the applicability of contempt procedures may well be evidenced by their interpretation of the federal statute's words "officer
of the court" not to include attorneys. 16 By such an interpretation
contempt sanctions are given one less subject, though in other contexts attorneys are considered officers of the court. Further, courts
have created mystic distinctions between civil and criminal, direct
and indirect contempts,17 often to avoid or apply specific procedural
protections attaching to those various kinds of contempts, if in disregard of all other legal symmetry.18 Many of the tenuous judicial
classifications of contempt appear to have been prompted, at least
in part, by a desire to avoid the summary procedures typical of certain types of contempt. In other more isolated instances, courts
have gone far to interpret statutes and situations in order to arrive
at more just results, where the contempt power, strictly construed,
might not have clearly directed such results. Thus one can note in
the present body of contempt law a trend toward limiting in specific instances the harshness of certain procedures customarily used
in trying contemnors.
Beyond the statutory scheme within which the contempt power
is now operative, the greater, more taxing and more vital issues
15 See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 280 (1923); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,
247 U.S. 402, 418-19 (1918); Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 278 (1889); Froelich v. United States, 33
F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1929). Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-52 (1941), overruling
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra.
16 See Cam.mer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956). But see Farese v. United
States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954); Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (6th
Cir. 1941).
17 Contempt of court has been traditionally classified as either criminal or civil.
Criminal contempt relates to conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the
court, involving an act obstructing the administration of justice or which is disrespectful
to the judiciary. Civil contempt, on the other hand, consists essentially in a failure to
perform, or not perform, an act as ordered by a court in a civil action for the benefit
of the opposing litigant. If, however, the contempt consists of doing a forbidden act,
injurious to the opposing party, it may be considered as criminal. Whatever the initial
classification, a contempt has usually been further categorized as either direct or indirect
(or constructive). A direct contempt of court involves an act committed in the physical
presence of the court while it is in session. An indirect (or constructive) contempt is
one in which the contemptuous act is committed outside the court's presence. See, e.g.,
Nelles, The Summary Power To Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 956, 960-61
(1931).
18 See generally Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv,
44 (1961).
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concerning limitations of the contempt power lie in the Constitution. As with so many important legal issues, it is necessary, in this
case, to examine those parts of the Constitution which in a number
of ways would appear to curb and qualify the contempt power.

II.

TRIAL BY JURY

The most apparent abridgement of civil liberties resulting from
current contempt practices is the denial of the right of an accused
to have a trial by jury. Originally, few contempts in this country
were tried by a jury. Gradually, American courts and legislatures,
while relentlessly adhering to other vestigial common-law characteristics of the contempt power, have discernibly, if sketchily, retreated from an absolute denial of the right to a jury trial. Now,
all contempts of Congress are tried by a jury; so are indirect criminal contempts of court if they arise out of certain labor disputes,
if the act constitutes another state or federal crime, or if it arises
under the Civil Rights Acts. But all direct criminal contempts, the
remaining indirect criminal contempts, and all civil contempts
continue to be punished summarily.
A recent decision, Green v. United States,1 9 clearly underscored
both the problems with respect to the right to trial by jury in criminal contempt cases, and a political dilemma which arises out of
the judicial dispositions of Supreme Court members, affecting the
law in general, and contempt law more particularly. The case involved two of the men who had been convicted in the celebrated
New York Smith Act trial for conspiring to teach and advocate the
violent overthrow of the government of the United States. They
were sentenced to five-year imprisonments and 10,000 dollar fines.
They were released on bail, but the court ordered them to appear
on a set date for execution of their sentences. On that date it was
discovered that they had absconded. They remained fugitives until
their voluntary surrender four and one-half years later. At that
time the United States brought criminal contempt charges against
them for willful disobedience of the surrender order. This action
was tried by the district court without a jury; they were found
guilty and were sentenced to an additional term of three years'"
imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction and sentence, finding no reasons of law, history, or policy which would
mitigate the egregious offense of the defendants.
No one would seriously suggest that the defendant's tardiness
19 356

U.S. 165 (1958).
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ought to have gone unsanctioned. The issue which the Green decision raised was the extent to which the constitutional safeguard of
trial by jury is applicable to criminal contempts. Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion, disposed of issues regarding
the applicability and extent of the contempt power by resort to the
accepted history and precedent surrounding the exercise of this
power. Conflicting constitutional safeguards were dismissed as being inapplicable. An existing bail-jumping statute,20 under which
defendants might have been tried, was deemed irrelevant.
Mr. Justice Black, in a strong dissent, criticized the summary
nature of the contempt power as "an anomaly in the law," ripe for
"fundamental and searching reconsideration." 21 He called for judicial action which would reconcile the existence of a contempt
power with what he conceived to be basic principles of the American form of government and our Constitution. His principal complaint was that the manner in which the contempt power is administered denies the accused's traditional right to trial by jury, in
his words, the "birthplace of free men." 22
This sharp divergence in attitude emphasizes the vital importance of the membership of the Supreme Court in the resolution
of legal, political and even philosophical problems. Statement of
such a conclusion unfortunately comes more easily than accurate
and thorough description of the precise sources of the difference.
As well as any single legal issue, the review of contempt practices
crystallizes the existing differences in attitude within the recent
Court.
The majority disposition is best attributed to Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's philosophy concerning the nature of judicial power.
In 1924, while a member of the faculty at Harvard Law School,
Professor Frankfurter and a colleague published an article which
unearthed much of the academic misconception about the summary
use of the contempt power.23 The clear import of the article was
one of criticism. In fact, in his attack upon the historical support
for the summariness of contempt procedures, Mr. Justice Black
alluded to this article, and noted that the myth of immemorial
usage as a justification for continuance of the practice had been
exploded by recent scholarship.24 Yet, Mr. Justice Frankfurter con20
21
22
23
24

18 u.s.c. § 3146 (1958).
356 U.S. at 193-94.
Id. at 209.
Frankfurter &: Landis, Power To Regulate Contempts, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1924).
356 U.S. at 202-03.
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curred in the majority opinion in the Green case, which upheld
the contempt conviction, for reasons which he has typically urged.
Change, he argued, must come, if at all, from the legislature. Courts
are inhibited in this respect, notwithstanding their impressions concerning the merits of the existing law. He stated that "the fact that
scholarship has shown that historical assumptions regarding the
procedure for punishment of contempt of court were ill-founded,
hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial
history of federal law based on such assumptions." 25 Calling a roll
of Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges who for
150 years approved of the summary use of the criminal contempt
power, and admonishing that the court is not a third branch of the
legislature, Mr. Justice Frankfurter refused "to fashion a wholly
novel constitutional doctrine ... in the teeth of an unbroken legislative and judicial history." 26 Citing former Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes' words- "we do not write on a blank sheet"-and never
mentioning the merits or demerits of the doctrine at issue, he cast
the vote which made his views the substance of the majority decision.
When Mr. Justice Black's attitude about those matters deemed
crucial by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is compared, their differences
become apparent. After stating his fear of the political dangers of
the summary contempt power arising out of their conflict with the
Bill of Rights, he urged that the precedents mentioned by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter should be rejected because they were wrong.
Though sound policy directs adherence to prior decisions, this
practice should not be so inflexible as to preclude correction of
obvious errors. Mr. Justice Black suggested that the prime responsibility of the courts lies precisely in the exercise of this power to
reappraise when valued parts of the Constitution are jeopardized.21
Mr. Justice Black is usually characterized as the leader of that
school of Supreme Court personnel loosely labelled as liberals or
judicial activists. Speaking often in dissent, this group has been
chiefly concerned with the substantial effect of any law upon the
rights and liberties of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution
in the Bill of Rights. The attitudinal conflict within the Court,
which often reappears in the garb of legal rationales, has had an
enormous impact upon contemporary American law and society
Id. at 189.
Id. at 193.
21 Id. at 195-98.
25

26
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in general, and often lies at the heart of the contempt decisions of
American courts.
There has been, in the past quarter of a century, an increasing
inclination to alleviate some of the procedural harshness of standard contempt procedures. Extension of the right to trial by jury
has been a foremost example of this trend. This trend is at least in
part reflective of generally changing attitudes toward the value of
the jury method of trial. As with more mundane fashions, the
vogue toward the value of the jury system has had periods of rising
and falling favor. Critics of the jury system in general have been
as frequent and as vociferous as have been its advocates. Rather
than digressing to enumerate the arguments, it should be only
briefly noted that summary contempt procedures are most obnoxious to those who place faith and importance in the libertarian
nature of trials by jury.
It could well be suggested that, most peculiarly in contempt
cases, the jury has a valuable role. First, it permits public participation in a dispute which is usually of an official, governmental
character. Public enlightenment, even if only through jury representation, has been characterized as an "indispensable element in
the popular vindication of the criminal law."28 This hopefully encourages popular understanding and acceptance of the administration of justice. Secondly, the jury may serve as an insulation
between the alleged offender and the offended party (who is sometimes his judge and sentencer), allowing the jury, in an otherwise
unlimited, uncontrolled situation, to function as a wall against
possible abuses by governmental powerholders upon individuals.
The general public may look with skepticism upon a judicial process which allows one man to be victim, prosecutor, judge, and jury,
while, as Mr. Justice Black has aptly observed, there is inclined to
be less false martyrdom where a jury convicts. Thirdly, there are
subtle subversive potentialities in summary criminal proceedings
other than the direct issues concerning who should be the decisionmaker and why. The lack of external restraints over the vices of
summary proceedings was also scored by Mr. Justice Black in his
dissent to the Green decision. The detached review of a contempt
decision by an appellate court whose members are sometimes sympathetic to their brethren of the lower trial courts, and are often
hesitant to reverse in absence of clear and serious error, is to some
viewers an impotent or idle ceremony. Therefore, the original
28

Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 23, at 1054.
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denial of a jury trial is not only dangerous in itself, but this danger
is compounded by being carried up through appellate levels in the
form of an often "cold," unreviewable record. 29 Judicial self-restraint, as that voiced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Green
decision, induces lethargy in appellate judicial scrutiny. This has
provoked Mr. Justice Black to comment that this offense, which is
inordinately vague and sweeping in substantive scope, is now punished by the harshest procedures known to law and is subject only
to token review. 30
For better or worse American law has adopted the practice of
summarily trying contempt cases. How, then, can this practice be
justified in light of our most basic legal directives-those found in
the Constitution? With respect to the right to trial by jury, article
III, section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The trial of all crimes,
except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...." This particular section was included within the early substance of the Constitution as a reflection of the strong feelings at the time of our
nation's birth that the right to trial by jury was coequal with, and
essential to, a government under law free from tyrannical abuse.
The deprivation of this right was one of the serious grievances
which the American settlers held against the King. 31 Specific exceptions to this guarantee were included in the Constitution, so
that it can be argued that the intent was not to exclude contempt
from this coverage since it is not one of those exceptions. This argument is strengthened by the fact that contempt is not listed as a
special judicial or legislative power in the enumeration of the
granted powers of those governmental branches. Any other conclusion respecting this aspect of the contempt power is interpretive,
and based on less evidence. In the Green case, again, Mr. Justice
Black noted that, although called upon to present any available
evidence of intent on the part of the authors of the Constitution
or expressed at the original state conventions, the government attorneys in that case could find no corroboration for the use of
summary contempt proceedings.32 The cases during this period do
not illuminate this uncertainty.33
The Bill of Rights twice reaffirmed the importance to the people of the right to trial by jury. The fifth amendment directs that
See 356 U.S. at 200.
so Id. at 199-200.
31 See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1778-1789, at 69 (Ford ed. 1904).
32 356 U.S. at 206-07.
33 See Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 258, 262 (1958).

29
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"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury ...." And the sixth amendment follows, declaring: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ...." The import of this
latter constitutional provision was applied to the contempt situation in these compelling words:
"The history which gave rise to the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the right of trial by jury 'is succinctly summarized in the Declaration of Independence in which complaint
was made that the Colonies were deprived "in many cases, of
the benefits of Trial by Jury." '
"The Constitution provides, 'The Trial of all Crimes ...
shall be by Jury... .' But those fresh from experiences with
tyranny were not content with this general guarantee, and
Amendments VI and VII were promptly adopted, the former
providing: 'In all [criminal prosecutions], the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury... .' The concept of a criminal 'prosecution' is broader
than a 'trial' and the addition of the more inclusive term indicates a determination to afford the right of trial by jury to
those subjected to prosecution of any sort which might result
in fine or imprisonment. The selection of the language of the
Sixth Amendment is hardly explainable upon any other postulate."34
Nonetheless, contemptuous conduct has been excluded from these
constitutional protections and those who have disputed the clear
meaning of these words have, for the most part, prevailed in their
unique constitutional interpretations.
The right to jury trial is initially dependent upon an ability
to classify the contemptuous act as criminal.315 Writers, judges, and
lawmakers have peremptorily brushed aside any argument about
juries for civil contempts with declarations that such procedural
provisions simply do not apply to the ordinary contempt situation. 86
Interestingly, even Mr. Justice Black has found no fault with summary procedures for civil contempts, although he has suggested
that all criminal contempts be tried by a jury. In this former respect, he is not in a minority. Since civil contempts most often arise
out of equity proceedings, the seventh amendment's guarantee of
34

Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1956).

85 See Goldfarb, supra note 18.
36 See, e.g., Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
TISE ON CONTEMPT § 10 (1890).

2-3 (1927); RAPALJE, A TREA-

1962]

THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT

293

jury trials in civil matters would by its own terms-"In Suits At
Common Law"-be inapplicable. So, civil contemnors are between
two rules. One allows jury trial in civil matters arising out of other
than equity actions. The other guarantees jury trial in criminal
cases, a category from which civil contempts have been exempted,
though many characteristics of criminal treatment attach in those
cases.
With these constitutional provisions in mind, as well as the
judicial and legislative fiats concerning contemporary contempt
practice, an analysis of the propriety of jury trial would seem appropriate. Is contempt a crime? Is it an infamous crime? Are there
any valid reasons for applying variant non-jury procedures in this
situation?
The fifth amendment speaks of "infamous crimes." Like the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishments, this phrase is subject to changing interpretations. In 1885
the Supreme Court, drawing upon Lord Auckland's Principles of
Penal Law, attempted to impart substance into the words "infamous crime." 37 Ruling that no United States court had jurisdiction over infamous crimes unless the fifth amendment's conditions
precedent of indictment and grand jury were fulfilled, the Court
set up two criteria of "infamy." The first entailed an inquiry into
whether a conviction for that particular crime would result in i
impeaching the credibility of the criminal in the future. This is
based on an old rule of evidence which impugns the credibility of
testimony given by one who has committed a crime involving moral
turpitude or bearing on veracity. This test for infamy may become
circuitous when one presses for definitions of moral turpitude. This
legal term of art is often applied as an ingredient or characteristic
of more infamous crimes, the type which would reasonably connote
some questionable trait bearing on the probable truthfulness of
the criminal. Reasonable as this rule may be, in the present context
it leaves one with a formula stating that infamous crimes bear on
credibility, and crimes bearing on credibility are infamous. It
leaves indeterminant which crimes are by their nature infamous,
or which aspects of criminal behavior bear either upon the infamy
of the crime or the credibility of the criminal.
The second criterion, which the Court adopted as a guide to
determine the infamous nature of a crime, involved the mode of
punishment authorized for the particular crime. Here again there
37

Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885).
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is less insight afforded before the fact to establish the nature of a
crime than reflection after the crime has been characterized or
classified. Since in contempt cases, where no constitutional or statutory maximums exist, the potential extent of the punishment is unlimited, and therefore unknown until it is announced, one cannot
determine at the time of indictment whether the crime is infamous
or not. This phenomenon accounts for the inadequacy of the mode
of punishment test in classifying criminal contempts as infamous.
The Court has also mentioned that the nature of the crime,
independent of its punishment, determined its characterization as
infamous. Therefore precedent is only partly helpful in determin• ing whether contempt, or any crime, is infamous and warrants the
protection of the fifth amendment. What was infamous early in
English history may not have been so during the period of American colonialism, and in turn may or may not be so at the present
time. Generally, the decisions have held that the possibility that
grave punishment could be inflicted is the test for an infamous
crime, and the test of grave punishment is the possibility of being
sentenced to hard labor or imprisonment. This tautological logic
consists of little more than holding that an infamous crime is infamous, and that infamous crimes are treated with punishments
worthy of infamy. This is of little assistance in cases where there
is question as to whether a crime has been committed, and what the
sentence will ultimately be.
Later decisions appear to have adopted the mode-of-punishment
test. 38 If a crime can be punished by a sentence including imprisonment or hard labor, it is infamous. Again, a contemnor often
does not know that he has committed what a court may later decide
was a criminal contempt, or what his sentence will be even if he has
some notion of his contemptibility. It is suggested that without
employing further semantic niceties, it can be fairly concluded that
contempt qualifies as an infamous crime by any reasonable standard which considers either the nature of the wrong or the usual
gravity of the sentence. Contemporary America can concern herself
with the procedural protection of her people who commit acts for
which serious and unlimited prison sentences can be exacted, and
which are as socially grave as rationales for the contempt power
imply. The right to an indictment and a grand jury hearing has
already been recognized in limited contempt situations by legislaJ.

38 See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 436-41 (1922); United States v.
Lindsay Wells Co., 186 Fed. 248, 249-50
.D. Tenn. 1910).

r.v
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tion. Those areas which are not now embraced by this protection,
other than civil contempts, should be. Society is apt to lose less by
the minor delays and insignificant expenses of jury trials than it
may from the insecurity which flows from arbitrary treatment of
its citizens. Inexpensive, fast or easy convictions are the aim of
neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights, and in fact are a
trifling economy in view of the inequities likely to result from such
unrestrained governmental tactics. This conclusion is strengthened
by reference to the statutory definition of a felony as any offense
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year. 39 Contempt frequently qualifies under this criterion, as well
as having all other characteristics commonly attributed to crimes.
The other pertinent constitutional jury provisions allow even
less latitude. That there shall be no trial without jury admits of
little interpretation. But the courts have ignored this constitutional
admonition, or disregarded it as inapplicable to contempt.
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has often
entailed no more than a matter of retrospective classification of
characteristics. The courts are as inconsistent in their conclusions
as they are in deciding upon which characteristics to base their
classification. So, while the Supreme Court was saying at one time:
"These contempts are infractions of law visited with the
punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal we are in
error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as
that word has been understood in English speech. So truly
are they crimes that it seems to be proved that in the early
laws they were punished only by the usual procedure ... and
that at least in England it seems that they may be and preferable are tried in that way," 40
at another time it was asserting with equal authority and vigor:
"If it has ever been understood that proceedings according
to the common law for contempt of court have been subject
to the right of trial by jury we have been unable to find any
instance of it. It has always been one of the attributes-one
of the powers necessarily incident to a court of justice-that
it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, or enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult, without
the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it in the exercise
of this power."41
so 18 U.S.C. § l(l) (1958).
40 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610·11 (1914).
41 Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890).
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And a still more judicious, if not more perplexed Court, was saying
about the dichotomatic difference between criminal and civil contempts that "it may not always be easy to classify a particular act
as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of
the characteristics of both." 42
The decision last quoted from held that contempt was sui
generis, possessing the qualities of both civil and criminal wrongs. 43
Indeed it does. On the authority of precedent alone, that Court
said that although contempt is criminal in nature, it is not criminal
in the sense that the sixth amendment envisions.44 So concluding,
it denied the right to a jury trial. This inconsistent, illogical judicial treatment is not unusual in contempt cases. Courts are wont
to justify their decisions on grounds that contempt is peculiar and
subject to novel treatment. Therefore it may be considered a crime
for the purposes of the statute of limitations and the pardon power,
but not for the purpose of applying the venue guarantees of the
sixth amendment. 45 Such ad hoc treatment is all too typical. Courts
have selectively held that contempt is what the Constitution meant
by a crime in one clause, but not what it envisioned in another.
All this is done with vision bordering on the clairvoyant, since the
constitutional authors left no evidence of their intent in this respect.
Strong statements like those of Mr. Justice Black, if not prevailing as judicial policy, have had some liberalizing effect on the
courts. Mr. Justice Jackson has written that summary punishments
must always and rightly should be regarded with disfavor. 46 In
another case, a court wrote:
"It is abhorrent to Anglo-Saxon justice as applied in this
country that a man, however lofty his station or venerated
his vestments, should have the power of taking another man's
liberty from him.
"Society has always permitted one exception,-a limited
right of courts to punish for contempts. But that right has
been grudgingly granted, and has been held down uniformly
to the 'least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' " 47

Mr. Justice Murphy expressed this hesitancy in these words:
Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
Id. at 336.
44 Id. at 337-38.
45 See United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 235 (1928).
46 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952).
47 Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1956).
42

43
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"The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an exception to our tradition of fair and complete hearings. Its use
should be carefully restricted...." 48
And more recently, a federal court reiterated:
" ... the grant of summary contempt power ... is to be grudgingly construed so that instances where there is no right to a
jury trial will be narrowly restricted to the bedrock cases
where concession of this drastic power to the courts is necessary to enable them to preserve ... authority ... order ...
decorum ...." 49
These three values-authority, order, and decorum-are currently tipping the scales away from constitutional protections accorded criminal defendants, though not without the aid of some
judges' thumbs. These are the overriding interests which courts
consider to eclipse the established right to jury trial-these and
the reverence of prevailing majorities of the Supreme Court for
steady, respected precedent.
This subject was treated long ago by Edward Livingston in his
famous work on the penal system of New Orleans.50 In discussing
the contempt power, he noted that all the rationales giving courts
broad and indefinite contempt powers are based upon necessity. 51
This is so even though the power itself is repugnant to all the
fundamental principles of criminal justice applicable to other
criminal acts. 112 He pointedly asked what sort of conduct would
secure a man against a vain or vindictive judge.53 The necessity
for promoting regard and respect for the judiciary which Blackstone offered as a justification for the contempt power-the need
for order and respect which courts now rely upon as authority for
this power-can be gained only by impeccable judicial conduct,
and not always by that. In response to the claims of necessity, he
wrote: "Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which the crown
has been successfully stripped, in England, but was in its day defended on the plea of necessity. Not one of the attempts to destroy
them, but was deemed a hazardous innovation." 54
Mr. Justice Black emphasized this same point in his Green
48 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (dissent).
49 Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d !112, 315 (1st Cir. 1954).
IIO

111
112
113
114

1 LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS ON
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
Ibid.
Id. at 264.

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE 258-67 (1873).
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dissent, pointing out that "necessary" has come to mean expedient
rather than indispensable, and is applied too loosely to warrant
derogation of fundamental constitutional rights. 55 Quoting with
agreement the suggestion of Mr. Justice Holmes that, where there
is no absolute need for immediate action, contempts should be
dealt with like other breaches of law, 56 he added that there is actually more of a need in the contempt situation for delay to prepare and prove a case than an urgency to try it immediately.57
Livingston suggested that although courts may have a right of
self-defense, only society as a whole has the right to punish offenses.
Once the interruption to the court's proceeding ceases, the sovereign should be the only one to punish, and then only according
to the procedures set out in the Constitution. It is not for the
individual, or for the incorporeal body that is wronged, to punish.
The sovereign which permits such retribution is radically defective
because this gives a single party the right to punish. The necessity
ends, he pointed out, with its own self-defense. The punishment
should be by law alone. Though a governmental body has the
power of self-defense, the power to punish should be exclusively
vested in society as a whole, and not in its individual departments.
He compared the practices in contempt cases with the right of
individuals to defend themselves against assault. Certainly an individual may defend himself. But once having defended himself,
he cannot punish his assailant other than through the orderly
processes of law. Livingston concluded that contempt is less a
necessity for the exercise of a legal power than an engine for its
abuse; and though courts should have the right to dispel interference with the performance of their functions, that power should
go no farther. 58
Still others have argued that the summariness of contempt proceedings is necessary because it speeds prosecutions, deters misconduct, avoids delay in the judicial process, and promotes the dignity
of the court. True as these observations may be, it is questionable
whether in our democratic society these expediencies-and this is
all that they are-are sufficient grounds to ignore important procedural safeguards, such as the right to jury trial, which are so imbedded in the democratic way of life and our system of justice.
And as long ago as 1874 the Supreme Court held that contempt
356 U.S. at 213.
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425-26 (1918) (dissent).
57 356 U.S. at 216.
58 I LMNGSTON, op. cit. supra note 50, at 266.
'
55

56
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of court is a specific criminal offense, and the fine therefor is a
criminal judgment.119 Yet, arguments continued, opinions varied
and exceptions were made, so that now there is no clear answer
to gain from history.
·
The Constitution is specific and clear. Criminal contempt
should be tried as other crimes are-with all procedural guarantees protecting the accused. There should be the right to a jury
trial of the charged contempt. The confusion wrought from vague
and misleading distinctions between civil and criminal contempts,
and the stronger policies of protecting individual liberty underscore this logical conclusion.
The argument that contempt is of a sui generis nature because
it has customarily been treated peculiarly, and that it is treated
this way because it is sui generis is of questionable appeal. Clearer
views, such as Mr. Justice Black's comment in the Sacher case that
"these contempt proceedings are 'criminal prosecutions' brought
to avenge an alleged public wrong ..." 60 are more directly reasoned, if not preferable in substance.
There are instances where an act of contempt simultaneously
constitutes another crime. There, by statute, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial. Such laws were probably enacted to avoid the
circumvention of the right to a jury trial by hasty or angry judges,
who might treat an ambivalent act as a contempt instead of whatever other crime it was, in order to apply the stricter contempt
procedures. How, it could be asked, can an act be a crime for so
many purposes61-perjury, bribery, etc.-and sui generis for another-contempt?
·
When a man is deprived of his property or liberty as punishment for commission or omission of an act which is proscribed by
society, for whatever reason, he is treated as a criminal. In contempt cases there are no reasons strong enough to override the
long and well-established policies guaranteeing the right to be
tried by a jury, after indictment, and in the ordinary course of the
law. The Constitution is quite clear in its directives in this respect.
The policies involved go to support, at least in comparative value,
the Constitution's implications.
In the Green case, Mr. Justice Black in his dissent carefully
articulated the argument for reinstatement of jury protections in
criminal contempt cases. With a directness and clarity that should
119
60
01

New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 392 (1874).
343 U.S. at 20.
See, e.g., In Te Steiner, 195 Fed. 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
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be the standard of all who would follow this view in the future,
he wrote:
"The power of the judge to inflict punishment for criminal
contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an
anomaly in the law. In my judgment the time has come for a
fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of
this power which has aptly been characterized by a State
Supreme Court as 'perhaps, nearest akin to despotic power
of any power existing under our form of government.' Even
though this extraordinary authority has slipped into the law as
a very limited and insignificant thing, it has relentlessly swollen, at the hands of not unwilling judges, until it has become
a drastic and pervasive mode of administering criminal justice
usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying those
charged with offenses against society. Therefore to me this
case involves basic questions of the highest importance far
transcending its particular facts. But the specific facts do provide a striking example of how the proce~ural safeguards
erected by the Bill of Rights are now easily evaded by the
ever-ready and boundless expedients of a judicial decree and
a summary contempt proceeding.
"I would reject those precedents which have held that the
federal courts can punish an alleged violation outside the
court room of their decrees by means of a sumro.ary trial, at
least as long as they can punish by severe prison sentences or
fines as they now can and do. I would hold that the defendants
here were entitled to be tried by a jury after indictment by a
grand jury and in full accordance with all the procedural safeguards required by the Constitution for 'all criminal prosecutions.' I am convinced that the previous cases to the contrary
are wrong-wholly wrong.'' 62

III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Some indirect ramifications of the exercise of the contempt
power raise questions relating to provisions of the first amendment.
All contempts are in the form of speech, writings, expressive acts or
inaction. The first amendment reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
02

356 U.S. at 193-94.
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A. Problems Involving Freedom of Religion
A freedom of religion issue arises only in a limited number of
contempt situations. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1793
reported that in a case which was tried on a Saturday "the defendant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused to be
sworn, because it was his Sabbath. The court, therefore, fined him
10£.; but the defendant, afterwards, waiving the benefit of his
testimony, he was discharged from the fine." 63 In a similar case,
the Supreme Court, while recognizing an excuse from swearing
for Quakers, denied it to a Jew, and found him in contempt for refusing to be sworn. 64 This type of problem is now somewhat obsolete since affirmation has been generally accepted as a substitute
for the court oath.
Another area of conflict, though not yet of serious proportions,
has recently been before the courts. The Supreme Court of Iowa
in 1956 dealt with the following situation. 65 A Protestant woman
and a Catholic man had married, and had had a child. They were
later divorced, agreeing that the mother would have custody of
the child and would rear him as a Roman Catholic. Years later the
father sought to have the mother punished for contempt because
she was rearing the child as a Protestant. The trial court held
the mother in contempt, but suspended her sentence, giving her
an opportunity to purge the contempt by rearing the child as a
Catholic. This was a civil contempt proceeding to coerce her to
act. She appealed to the state supreme court on the ground that
this treatment violated her right to the free exercise of religion
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The court
reversed the contempt conviction, but on the ground that the
decree which she had disobeyed was too vague and uncertain to
warrant a contempt citation for its breach, 66 thus avoiding the
constitutional issue raised by the first amendment.
There is some analogous, though indirect, precedent to support
this first amendment defense. Rearing a child in a particular faith
has been held to be the exercise of a religious act by the parent. 67
And the right of custody includes the right to dictate the religious
teachings which one's child will receive. Parental agreements conos Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1793).
United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14858) (Mass. Cir. Ct. 1815).
Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956).
Id, at 75, 78 N.W.2d at 496-97.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534.35 (1925).
64
65
66
67
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cerning the religious education of a child are not so binding, in
this context, that they cannot be altered by one of the parties free
from legal censure. 68 Those moral inhibitions of personal conscience which may flow from such an agreement have not been
considered to be within the control of the law. Such a judicial
attitude involves a proper and natural application of the principle
of governmental non-interference with first amendment rights by
the courts-applicable to the states through the operation of the
fourteenth amendment. 69
Precedent such as this does not and ought not leave the offended person without a remedy; the critical issue is with the
nature of that remedy. Penal sanctions, such as those implicit in
the civil contempt power, are not proper. The frustrated father
may still seek the strictly civil, supervisory aid of the courts to
protect his rights in ways less drastic than imprisonment of his
spouse, or former spouse. Only the gravest social necessities should
be deemed sufficient to warrant governmental curtailment of rights
of religious activity. 70 Even then it is questionable whether the
contempt power is the most suitable vehicle of control.
The issue which this problem raises could, under the present
unpredictable status of the contempt power, fission into several
tangential problems. The matrimonial, surrogate and juvenile
courts are often called upon to deal with situations involving
questions of religious freedom. Although there are numerous instances in which these courts might feel compelled to exercise
their contempt power, there is no clear-cut resolution of the problems raised by the first amendment's guarantee of religious liberty
by the contempt cases to date. Better reason would suggest judicial
abstinence in this area, at least insofar as the exercise of the contempt power is concerned.
B. Problems Involving Freedom of Speech and of the Press

The free speech and press decisions in which the judicial contempt power has been questioned might, by analogy, offer a solution to the religious liberty problem. In these cases, the courts have
adopted a strictly construed "clear and present danger" test for
68 See generally Friedman, The Parental Right To Control the Religious Education
of a Child, 29 HA.Rv. L. REv. 485, 497-98 (1916); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1286, 1292·93 (1941).
69 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
70 See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ v. Utah, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appi:al
dismissed, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
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balancing the exercise of first amendment rights with other interests which are often augmented by the sanction of the contempt
power.
This doctrine gradually evolved from the protracted controversy within the Supreme Court concerning contempt by press
publications in this country. Both the United States and England
have long wrestled with the problem of maintaining a free press
consonant with a system of fair trials. 71 Often, the two goals have
conflicted and, presently, both countries resolve the conflict by
resorting, or not resorting, to the same contempt power.72
In this country, the contempt by publication problem began
as one of interpretation of the federal contempt statute. Courts
were given the power to punish contempts in their presence "or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."73 This
clause was first applied in its causal connotation.74 The application
of the contempt sanction was left to the discretion of the judge,
who could punish accordingly if a publication's commentary had
a reasonable tendency to obstruct justice. This approach was abandoned in 1941, when the Supreme Court decided that the quoted
words from the federal statute should be interpreted in a physical,
rather than causal, context.75 Since most press publication occurs
neither in the presence of the court nor "near thereto" geographically, the power to punish contemptuous publications was made
ineffectual.76 Soon thereafter, the Court acknowledged the presence
of the first amendment issues by adopting and applying Mr. Justice
Holmes' clear-and-present-danger test77 to press comments about
pending cases. 78 This approach has been held applicable to the
contempt powers of both the federal and state courts. Mr. Justice
Black has referred to the clear-and-present-danger test as "a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished.'' 79
The evils envisioned in the contempt by publication decisions
71 See generally Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre,
86 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1961).
72 See generally Donnelly 8: Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in the United States,
24 MoDERN L. REv. 239 (1961).
73 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1958).
74 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 420 (1918).
75 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-49 (1941).
76 See generally Donnelly 8: Goldfarb, supra note 72, at 241.
77 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
78 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941).
79 Id. at 263.

304

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

are disrespect to the judiciary and interference with the administration of justice. Through the years the Supreme Court has not allowed the exercise of the contempt power in the former instance.
The rationale has been that judges should be above personal attack, and that popular respect for the judiciary is less apt to be
gained from exercise of the contempt power than from exemplary
judicial conduct subject to open criticism. "The assumption,"
Mr. Justice Black noted, "that respect for the judiciary can be won
by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises
the character of American public opinion." 80
Though recognizing the possibility of contempt treatment in
the second category of presumed evils resulting from press comments-interference with the administration of justice-courts
have been chary to find the instance where the need to protect the
fairness of trials overrode the value to be gained from permitting
free discussion. The decisions· indicate that the courts have been
more concerned with the conflict between the rights to fair trial
and freedom of the press than with developing a consistent doctrine
with respect to the power to punish contempts by publication on
theories implicit in the contempt power itself.81 The Supreme
Court's formula seems to grant the press a virtual immunity from
contempt rather than resolve its historic struggle with the courts.
Nevertheless, the actual scope of the immunity continues to be
uncertain. 82
Though the majority of the Supreme Court has limited contempt as used against the press, a minority of the Court has
consistently sought a broadening of the scope of the contempt
power. However, the Court has recognized press abuse only under
the due process clause, where press commentary has made a fair
trial impossible.83 Moreover, the clear-and-present-danger test has
been somewhat extended in decisions other than those involving
the contempt power by emphasizing the magnitude of the danger
of the evil as an aspect of its imminence. 84 A change in personnel
on the Court might tip the balance in favor of the minority which
has been disposed toward extension of the contempt power in these
cases in emulation of the English courts.85
Id. at 270.
See generally Donnelly &: Goldfarb, supra note 72; Goldfarb, supra note 71.
See generally Donnelly &: Goldfarb, supra note 72, at 243.
See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
80
81
82
83
84
85
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Individuals, on the whole, have not fared as well as the institutionalized press in avoiding contempt convictions for what might
otherwise be characterized as an exercise of first amendment rights.
In one decision the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction of an attorney who disobeyed a trial court's admonition to be
silent about a certain matter in his summation to the jury.86 Mr.
Justice Black, for a four-man minority, wrote in his dissent to this
decision: "Fisher having been stopped at one point tried another
strategy. He was acting the role of a resourceful lawyer. The decision which penalizes him for that zeal sanctions censorship inside
a courtroom where the ideals of freedom of speech should flourish."87
Another attorney was fined 1,000 dollars and imprisoned by a
state court for six months for a contempt which had consisted of
a series of critical letters and articles about the state judiciary.88
A television announcer was found in contempt for comments made
"over the air" concerning parties to a pending divorce proceeding
in response to personal claims made against him in the divorce action. 89 The trial court exercised its contempt power on the ground
that the administration of justice had been impaired. A single
letter to a judge was considered contemptuous,90 while an advertisement by an insurance company concerning excessive verdicts and
their economic effect was held not to present a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice.91 A more recent case dealt
with an avid segregationist who made a rousing speech to fifteen
hundred people urging disobedience of federal court orders relating to the integration of Tennessee public schools. 92 He spoke in
violation of an injunction against interference with the court's
integration order. The court upheld a contempt conviction, and
ruled that the conduct of the contemnor was not protected by the
first amendment. Since the right of free speech is not absolute, it
can be subordinated to legitimate and overriding governmental
objectives. He had created a clear and present danger of public
disorder, and it was held that the first amendment did not give
him the right to incite others to violence.93
86

Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 162-63 (1949).

87 Id. at 165-66.

Stone v. State, 77 Wyo. 1, 53, 305 P .2d 777, 799, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1026 (1957).
People v. Goss, IO Ill. 2d 533, 538-39, 141 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1957), reversing on
other grounds the lower court's contempt order. See Note, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 123 (1957).
90 Ex parte Ewell, 71 Cal. App. 744, 236 Pac. 205 (1925).
01 Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 176 Kan. 101,110,269 P.2d 435,442 (1954).
02 Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
oa Id. at 95-96.
88
80
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The cases in this area are too numerous to list comprehensively.
Since most disobedience which would constitute a contempt is involved in some act which might well come within the protection of
the first amendment, the possibilities of conflict are myriadal. One
can examine any contempt case, and the probabilities are high that
it involves some form of speech when silence was appropriate, or
silence when speech was demanded.
This problem is most vexing with respect to the conduct of
lawyers in the course of trials. At what point does the proper zeal
of advocacy end and contumacy commence? Although, on the one
hand, attorneys should be given the broadest margin to advocate
their clients' causes effectively, on the other they are representatives
of the court with a professional interest in the fair and respectful
administration of justice.
There is no satisfactory answer to this dilemma, and courts
have treated these situations in an ad hoc fashion. Recently, the
Supreme Court disposed of two such cases. In re McConnell 94
dealt with an attorney who violated a court order to discontinue
an offer of proof which the attorney felt in good faith was required
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court summarily found him in contempt for obstructing the administration
of justice. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating
that a lawyer's arguments for his client do not amount to contempt
of court unless they so exceed the line of duty as to constitute an
obstruction of the performance of judicial duties. Surely this line
of demarcation is so vague and subjective as to provide little if
any reasonable and foreseeable standard or guide. The second
case, In re Green,95 dealt with an attorney who advised a union
client to test the validity of a state court injunction because only
the NLRB had jurisdiction to issue the requested order. The
court found the attorney in contempt without a hearing. The
Supreme Court reversed this conviction on the ground that it
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
did not reach the first amendment issue.
The status of the individual who claims that the first amendment shields him from the contempt power of the courts is less
certain than is that of the identical person who writes the same
comments in a newspaper or magazine. In such situations the
clear-and-present-danger test will usually be applied, but with less
94

95

370 U.S. 230 (1962).
369 U.S. 689 (1962).
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certain expectation of sympathetic judicial reaction. There are
no clear policies, doctrines or trends. Analogy with the press cases
would indicate a liberal predisposition since the dangers of interference with proceedings by the press are greater than those
which might be caused by individuals. The courts' leniency in
the press cases has been consistent. The lower courts have taken
a case-by-case approach in non-press cases, and no cause celebre
or precedent-setting decision has reached the Supreme Court which
might hint of an established attitude. Nevertheless, although the
degree of interference with the administration of justice by an
individual would, in most cases, be less than that of the ubiquitous
press, the individual's greater susceptibility to contempt conviction is indicated by a study of court decisions. Possibly this is
explained by the fact that many cases of contempt by individuals
arise out of personal incidents involving direct affrontery to the
judiciary. There is a danger that these convictions may in fact
be more the result of governmental power being exercised for
personal or emotional reasons than a desire to foster the efficient
administration of justice. It may, as well, be a manifestation of
the long-inculcated American attitude favoring the judicial power
and the necessity for contempt law.
Acceptance of what is now a minority view-that first amendment rights are absolute-would clearly resolve these issues. The
wisdom as well as the popularity of such an attitude is open to
question which it is not the purpose of this article to include
or evaluate, except insofar as it affects the present subject. In the
contempt context, it is not unreasonable to suggest a complete
first amendment protection of the press. Since judges may be
left to private actions for defamatory criticism by the press, and
ought to be able to withstand non-defamatory criticism, the principal reason for the contempt power is to protect the fairness of
the trial itself. This can be accomplished in ways calculated to
interfere less with vital constitutional rights such as freedom of
the press. In non-press cases it could be argued that the contempt
power should be changed in this respect too.
Some distinction between press-published comment and other
verbal activity might be developed, recognizing the right of press
or individual editorializing or opinion-venturing, while outlawing speech which is really no more ,than verbal misconduct of a
slanderous or clearly obstructive nature. This, too, provides only
a vague standard.
The thinking and words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, as expressed
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in his famous concurrence in Whitney v. California,96 echo eloquently over this issue, as they have over others in the intervening
years since they were uttered. Authority must be reconciled with
freedom; order should not be exalted over liberty. "[O]rder cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; ... it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; ... fear breeds repression; ... repression breeds hate; ...
hate menaces stable government . . . [and] the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely ...." 97

IV.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The fourth amendment provides that the people have the
right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that search warrants shall
not issue except upon probable cause and with sufficient particularity. Fourth amendment defenses have been raised indirectly
and infrequently in contempt of court cases, although such assertions in congressional contempt cases indicate the existence of
some analogies.
The moving spirit of this constitutional provision was the
protection of individual privacy from governmental trespass, 08 or
as one court put it, to protect against autocratic and despotic
action under the color of national authority.99 The amendment
was adopted in response to an unhappy English and colonial experience with general warrants and writs of assistance,1°0 and was
specifically aimed at protecting the interests of individual liberty
from governmental overbearing.IOI In words peculiarly applicable
to the contempt situation, though not so intended, one federal
court interpreted the policy of this amendment to mean that expediency in law enforcement must yield to the necessity of observing individual freedom. 102
It is now settled that Congress and the courts may compel
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Id. at 375.
Cf. Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1942): State v. Frye, 58
Ariz. 409, 418, 120 P .2d 793, 797 (1942).
99 United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed. 600, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1921).
100 See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1940): State
v. Nelson, 231 Iowa 177, 181, 300 N.W. 685, 687 (1941).
101 Cf. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932); United States v. Zager, 14
F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Md.), afj'd mem., 84 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 55S
(1936).
102 United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whisky Bottles, 52 F.2d 49,
50-51 (2d Cir. 1931).
96
97
98
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unwilling witnesses to disclose facts essential to proper governmental inquiry, and, to that end, may enforce the attendance of
witnesses and the disclosure of evidence through their subpoena
and contempt powers. 103 In this, they are limited only by the
general rules of procedure and the Constitution. Where an individual asserts his prerogative not to cooperate, these governmental bodies may exercise their contempt powers to punish him,
or to try to coerce his cooperation. A fourth amendment issue may
arise where an individual claims that compulsion of his testimony
or securance of his property amounts to a search or invasion of
privacy which the Constitution prohibits.
Critical to the issues raised by fourth amendment contempt
of Congress cases is the question whether the amendment's protection encompasses only physical, trespass-like interferences or
whether the scope of this provision is broad enough to cover indirect psychological interferences, such as those claimed in first
amendment defenses to congressional contempt convictions. In
this sense, the inquiry is directed beyond questions relevant to
the procedural application of the contempt power, and is addressed more to the substantive effect of its use upon rights of
privacy in general. ls the amendment aimed at physical searches
and seizures o'nly or, it could be asked, is it broader, encompassing
an intangible right of personal security-some privacy of person
and property?
In contempt of court cases where direct physical interference
is involved, the applicability of fourth amendment defenses is
clear, whether or not tenable under the circumstances. For example, a contempt of court conviction by which judges and clerks
concerned with a state election were punished for misbehavior in
office was upheld by the Illinois courts over the objection that the
trial court violated defendant's fourth amendment rights by opening ballot boxes and examining tally sheets which were used as
evidence against them. 104 Here, the assertion of the fourth amendment defense is obvious. The government physically took things
which were used as evidence against a defendant. Though the
court did not uphold the defense, its assertion was appropriate,
and typical of search and seizure cases in general.
The more indirect effects of the contempt power upon fourth
amendment rights are more obscure, and the issues less clearly
103

104

See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897).
People v. Montesano, 293 Ill. App. 630, 12 N.E.2d 915 (1938).
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defi.ned. 105 A recent federal case, though it dealt with a congressional contempt situation, is exemplary of the problem.106 There
the defendant argued that the threat of the contempt power nullified the voluntariness of his submission of incriminating evidence.
Called before a Senate investigating committee, defendant was
threatened and led to believe that he must testify and incriminate
himself, or be convicted of contempt for his refusal. The defendant surrendered a drawer full of papers and books and was thereafter convicted of violation of the lottery laws, the conviction being
based at least in part upon the evidence he submitted. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that he did not understand his alternatives,
and therefore his presentation of the incriminating evidence was
really involuntary, and thus was a violation of his fourth amendment rights. On appeal, the court of appeals ruled that his "freedom of choice had been dissolved in a brooding omnipresence
of compulsion. The Committee threatened prosecution for contempt if he refused to answer, for perjury if he lied, and for
gambling activities if he told the truth." 107 The court went on
to say: "Courts and committees rightly require answers to questions. But neither may exert this power to extort assent to invasions of homes and to· seizures of private papers. Assent so
extorted is no substitute for lawful process." 108 Concluding that
the evidence was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment, the court reversed the conviction. The dissenting judge
believed that the situation was one of proper compulsion, a sound
feature of the judicial process, and not an illegal coercion, and
that this did not violate the fourth amendment.100
The most profound issue raised-thus far unsuccessfullyconcerns judicial determination of the outermost reaches of the
fourth amendment, and the extent of the amendment's protection of the right of privacy. Does the fourth amendment protect
against infringements of a physical nature alone, or does it go
farther to protect people against invasions of personal thoughts,
associations, and property, and from public scrutiny and exposure? The defense that use of the contempt power violates the
right of privacy, guaranteed implicitly by the fourth amendment,
has not thus far met with success.
105 Cf. In re Estes, 87 F. Supp. 461, 462-63 (N.D. Tex. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Estes v.
Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951).
100 Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
107 Id. at 512.
10s Id. at 513.
100 Id. at 520-21.
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So far this issue has been dealt with by the courts only in
the context of congressional contempt defenses. In these situations
the courts have consistently held that forced disclosure through
contempt of Congress convictions is not protected by any right of
privacy which might be implicit in the policy of the fourth amendment. 110 Investigations prompted by national needs can then constitutionally invade an individual's right of privacy, at least insofar
as the fourth amendment is concerned. The decisions to date have
consistently held that, while the fourth amendment includes a
right of personal security from physical attack and inspection and
guarantees some element of personal sanctity and privacy, a proper
legislative investigation is not preempted thereby. 111
The Federal Rules of Civil112 and Criminal113 Procedure provide for contempt proceedings in case of failure to obey subpoenas.
It is conceivable that the thinking expressed in fourth amendment
defenses raised in congressional contempt cases might prompt the
assertion of a similar defense to a contempt of court conviction.
The congressional contempt decisions portend similar disposition
of possible contempt of court defenses alleging that forced disclosure or surrender of evidence violates a right of privacy protected
by the fourth amendment.
In the recent flood of congressional contempt cases, where all
constitutional defenses have been raised in defense to committee
exposure tactics, the lower federal courts have consistently followed
this approach.11 4 The mere fact that an individual's private affairs
are subjected to the public gaze has not been considered sufficiently
serious to bar an otherwise proper legislative inquiry.115 Still
there has been no clear-cut decision by the Supreme Court dealing
specifically and solely with the fourth amendment defense to a
contempt conviction arising out of a congressional investigation.
This defense is often made along with the gamut of other constitutional defenses which have been typically raised in these cases.
The federal courts have usually either denied the defenses in toto,
or upheld the defense on narrow procedural grounds or on the
basis of limited interpretations of a specific amendment other than
110 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
111 Id. at 294.
112 FED. RULE CIV. P. 45(£).
113 FED. RULE CRIM. P. 17(g).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d

82, 88 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 838 (1948).
115 See generally Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARv. L. R.Ev. 153, 219 (1926).
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the fourth. The applicability of the fourth amendment defense
to congressional investigations is closely linked with arguments
about the "exposure" function of legislatures, and the general
rights of individuals to resist inquiry into personal matters, exposure of which would subject them to unofficial public condemnation. To this extent the defense has been thrown into what
at times has been a hodge-podge of constitutional arguments, all
amounting to the position that "you can't do this to me" or
"there must be some constitutional provision to protect me." This
has caused some uncertainty as to the scope of the fourth amendment's provisions. Though the argument, in general, against
legislative infringement of conscience or intellectual privacy is
compelling, the legal rationale is less clearly attached to fourth
amendment principles than relevant to first amendment protections of privacy. Rights of privacy implicit in the fourth amendment differ from those guarded by the first. In the former, the
invaded privacy is one deriving from a trespass of subtle though
physical means, such as secretly wiretapping or televising speech
or conduct. However, that right of privacy which properly protects
persons from public ventilation of their spiritual or intellectual
ideas is more suitably derived from first amendment freedoms of
speech and association. To this extent, it would seem that right of
privacy defenses in these fourth amendment cases have been illadvised.
V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The fifth amendment provides:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ."
A.

Indictment by Grand Jury

The first clause of the fifth amendment, requiring a presentment or indictment by a grand jury prior to trial for criminal
offenses, has been mentioned briefly in connection with the discussion of the right to trial by jury. The guarantee has been long
established; it is based upon the idea that one should not be put
on trial until a body of his peers finds probable cause.
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Mr. Justice Gray, while a member of the Supreme Court,
elaborated on the purposes of the Constitution's grand jury requirement,116 though not with specific reference to the contempt
situation. He said that "whether a man shall be put upon his
trial for crime without a presentment or indictment by a grand
jury of his fellow citizens depends upon the consequences to himself if he shall be found guilty." 117 By this standard, contempt
would certainly qualify for grand jury protection, since the consequences of contempt convictions could be, and often are, grave.
Mr. Justice Gray went further, stating that no congressional declaration could defeat this safeguard.118 Broadly considered, the purpose of the clause was to limit the legislature as well as prosecuting
officers. Of course, the grand jury provision of the fifth amendment applies only to the federal government, and not to the
states.11 9 However, most states have similar requirements in their
own laws.
The Constitution specifically excludes certain classes of cases
from the protection of the grand jury provision.120 If contempt
was meant to be excluded, it is conspicuously absent from any
manifestation of historical intent-in the Constitution or elsewhere.
Surprisingly, although intermittent volleys of criticism have
been fired at most other contempt procedures, the denial of the
right to a grand jury hearing has provoked little attention or
comment. This may be because the broad criticisms made of
other contempt procedures implicitly include this argument. For
example, if a right to trial by jury were allowed, indictments of
some kind would probably follow a fortiori. If not, some of the
dangers of its absence would be rectified by the jury trial itself.
Sui generis rationales which are used in answer to other, often
stronger, complaints about summary contempt procedures would
undoubtedly be offered in response to arguments that the contemnor should be indicted by a grand jury.
In contempt cases arising out of disobedience to orders of a
court, it is not an unusual procedure for the action to be commenced by an order to show cause. Some courts have held that
the particularity required of an indictment is not necessary for a
116

111
118
1111
120

Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 426.
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
E.g., courts-martial.
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contempt charge, and that technical accuracy is not required. 121
In one case of contempt, which arose out of the carelessness of a
sheriff in permitting the escape of his prisoners, the contemnor
argued that the charge was not sufficiently made out in the information against him. The court, applying an exception to the
general rule requiring particularity of indictments, denied the
defense, and approved a fair notice standard for the indictment
requirement.122 But even so, such cases allowing a casual treatment of indictments impliedly conform procedurally to the constitutional directive that there be some form of indictment or
information.
No case has specifically challenged the constitutionality of the
practice, in direct contempt cases, of deeming the personal knowledge and action of the offended judge sufficient satisfaction of the
indictment-by-grand jury requirement. In certain cases of indirect
contempt, and with a contempt of Congress, no problem is presented because the customary grand jury procedure is required
by statute.123 But in cases of direct contempt, and in those cases
of indirect contempt where the proceedings are commenced by
the court sua sponte, by an order to show cause or similar procedural means, there may be a proper constitutional objection.
Of course, civil contempts are excluded from many fifth amendment protections because they are not crimes. Civil contempts
arise almost spontaneously, and are part of the original action
out of which they developed.
The contemnor may well be apprised of the proceedings
against him, even where summary procedures are applied. Under
the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indirect criminal contempts are prosecuted by an order to show cause or an
arrest order, and notice and hearing are guaranteed. 124 However,
pleadings may be based on information and belief, and direct
criminal contempts are prosecuted on a certified order of the
judge.
On the other hand, that policy of the fifth amendment's indictment clause which aims at insulating the individual from his
government by interposition of a popular group of his peers is
ignored. This right was adopted from the common law and is a
121 See, e.g., United States v. Seidman, 154 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1946); Conley v.
United States, 59 F.2d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1932).
122 Fanning v. United States, 72 F.2d 929, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1934).
123 52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
124 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
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mandatory rule in normal federal prosecutions, intended as a
substantial safeguard against oppressive or arbitrary proceedings.125
The contempt situation involves exactly the kind of summary
punishing power which this provision should cure. It is one of
the few situations where our government has been so brash as
to act in violence of this constitutional provision. To allow this
clear constitutional mandate to be circumvented on grounds of
expediency is to condone the abrogation of an important mandate of the Bill of Rights. There is no counterbalancing governmental necessity warranting the circumvention of this constitutional right, except that which would call for expeditious litigation.
Hurried justice may be no justice at all.
B. Double Jeopardy
The policy of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment may conflict with the contempt power to cause any one
of several difficult, somewhat mathematical problems. The double jeopardy problem can arise in two situations-the crossfire
and the reiterated contempt.
The crossfire situation is presented where one act constitutes
both contempt and another crime, either in the same or another
jurisdiction. For example, in the case of attempted bribery of a
witness, the briber could be found guilty of contempt and/ or subordination of perjury, or perjury if he was successful in his attempt. One wrongful act could then be punished twice. This
problem is compounded in a case where the act of contempt is
not a crime in the jurisdiction where it is committed, but constitutes a separate crime in another jurisdiction. From this possibility of crossfire of prosecutions arise problems involving dual
sovereignty, immunity and double jeopardy.
The second situation is one of multiplied pressures, in which
the contemnor is forced to reiterate his act of contempt after he
has been punished for the first act; or where one contempt is
multiplied by reiteration of the same or a similar situation as
resulted in the first contempt, and the separate punishment of
each repeated contempt is immediately sought. The first situation
could occur where an individual refuses to testify before a court,
is sentenced for contempt and, after serving his sentence, is recalled before the same court, again asked the same question, and
again sentenced for his second refusal. The other situation arises
125

See Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. I, 9 (1959).
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where a witness is asked a series of related questions, refuses to
answer any, and is punished separately for each contemptuous
refusal. In such cases a persistent inquisitor could punish a persistent contemnor indefinitely.
In considering the applicability of the double jeopardy clause
to contempt practices, it should be noted that the constitutional
provision is worded in terms of "offenses"-"nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy...."
Though verbally gymnastic critics have sidestepped or passed over
other constitutional protections in contempt cases, no one has gone
so far as to suggest that the unique act of contempt is not an
offense. In fact, "offense" is the word usually used to describe
contempt. Overcoming that hurdle, one can proceed to the substance of the clause.
C.

The Crossfire of Prosecutions
Mr. Justice Brandeis dealt with the crossfire situation in a
case in which a convicted contemnor argued that his conviction
for contempt of Congress was improper because the same act of
contumacy was made a crime by a special federal statute.126 The
offense in that case could have been punished twice--once for
contempt and again under the statute which made refusing to
answer questions or produce papers before either house a misdemeanor. Mr. Justice Brandeis dismissed the argument that the
defendant was immune from one punishment because of the existence of another. He wrote, "Punishment, purely as such, through
contempt proceedings, legislative or judicial, is not precluded
because punishment may also be inflicted for the same act as a
statutory offense." 127
An earlier Court, certain that this power would not be used
cumulatively, had previously upheld a conviction under a federal
statute which made refusal to testify before a Senate committee a
statutory misdemeanor, even though the contemnor was subject
to punishment for contempt of Congress as well.128 At that time
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller wrote:
"[I]t is quite clear that the contumacious witness is not subject to jeopardy twice for the same offense, since the same
act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also an
offense against another; and indictable statutory offenses may
126
121
128

Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
Id. at 151.
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897).
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be punished as such, while the offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two
being diverso intuitu and capable of standing together." 129
The theoretical ground for this practice, which seems to circumvent precisely those results which the double jeopardy clause
sought to prevent, is quite well settled. Where one act is both
a contempt and substantive crime, it is an offense against judicial
authority on the one hand, and against the state in general on
the other. One punishment then is for an offense against the
judiciary, and the other for violation of the law created by the
legislature.
Another judicial attitude, by which double jeopardy objections are avoided, was enunciated in United States v. United Mine
W orkers130 in 1946. There the Supreme Court avoided charges
of duplicity by classifying one contempt as criminal and another
as civil.131 The rationale for this approach was stated, though not
in a contempt case, in 1955.132 Congress may impose both a criminal and civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission,
since the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice,
or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same
offense. 133 So again, by its power to classify contempts, a court
may avoid double jeopardy problems by characterizing one of the
contempts as civil, though in effect treating it as an offense.
The more difficult state-federal jurisdictional problem also
arises in the context of contempt and double jeopardy. Early
authorities held that one criminal conviction would not bar later
prosecution for the same offense in another jurisdiction. Similarly,
contempt actions are not precluded merely because the same act
constitutes a crime such as perjury, bribery, or insubordination
in a second jurisdiction. Here the individual is subject to double
punishment for his one act. The misconduct is single; the offense
to society is single; but the sanction is multiple. 134 Recent statutes
have, however, granted the right to a jury trial in some instances
where one act is both a contempt and another crime.185 These
statutes, while preventing a conviction-minded court from circumventing a jury trial by treating an otherwise ordinary crime as a
1211 Ibid.
130 !1!10 U.S. 258 (1947). •
131 Id. at !100-01.
182 Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, !150 U.S. 148 (1956).
133 Id. at 150-51.
134 See Bartkus v. Illinois, !159 U.S. 121 (1959).
185 Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(£)

(Supp. III, 1962).
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contempt, do not satisfactorily alleviate the double jeopardy problem. One rationale for allowing double punishments in these cases
is that the social interest which warrants legal protection is different in contempt cases from that which might justify such action
in the case of another crime. Even though the wrongful act is
singular, the anti-social elements may be several. Contempt sanctions are aimed at misconduct which interferes with governmental activity. While kidnapping a witness, for example, is misconduct toward the person of an individual, it may also involve
an interference with government processes, and therefore constitute a contempt. The ·wrongful act is the same, but the interests
to be protected are different and, it is sometimes argued, warrant
separate treatment. The usual explanation for allowing separate
prosecutions in separate jurisdictions is, however, that the classic
thought behind the double jeopardy clause was to prevent one
sovereign from twice punishing the same act. It never was meant,
so the argument goes, to preclude a second action by a second
sovereign. So, one state may prosecute although the federal or
another state government has already prosecuted.

D. The Reiterated Contempt
The second area of difficulty involves the so-called reiterated
contempt. Assuming that all other elements were presented in a
given contempt situation, could the punished contemnor be repunished if adamant in his disobedience to the same, though later,
order? If the underlying justification for contempt convictions is
the punishment of affronts to judicial authority, then a second
contempt is a separate offense to that authority, although predicated on exactly similar facts. However, if the reason for using
the contempt power is to coerce cooperation or deter interference
with government bodies, then a repeated incident comes closer
to the double jeopardy prohibition. Although it might be argued
that continuous punishments for interference would tend to increase the coercive or deterrent force of the particular governmental body, the second punishment borders on the overbearing
power which the Constitution proscribes in the double jeopardy
clause.
The reiterated contempt situation directs attention, perhaps
more clearly than any of the others involving contempt procedures,
to the political and philosophical implications of this power.
A court may want information. An individual may desire privacy, The conflict of the two desires may and often does cause
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social friction of substantial political consequence. How far can
and should government go in pressing its collective will against
the uncooperative, free-willed individual? Even assuming that
government can punish an individual's obstructiveness, should it
be able to repunish for persistence of individual adamancy when
that individual has already been once punished for that same
characteristic? If so, when, if ever, is the government curtailed in
its insistence? The issue is one of policy which should be reflected
in the manner in which it is resolved by the law.
By the preponderance of judicial authority, the power of a
prosecutor initially to multiply contempts by reiterating similar
questions has been limited. In Yates v. United States, 136 the defendant was charged with violation of the Smith Act. After waiving her privilege against self-incrimination, she refused to answer
eleven questions put to her on cross-examination. The trial court
treated each refusal as a separate contempt and sentenced her to
one year in prison for each. Under such a system, the only thing
insulating the defendant from a one hundred-year sentence is the
limited stamina of the prosecutor. Fortunately, our system of
justice is based on sounder principles. The Supreme Court held
that her refusals constituted only one contempt. Refusal to answer many questions within one area of refusal, it stated, constitutes but a single offense. 137 This concept has been applied in
some state court decisions, but ignored in others.138 Although
lower federal court decisions had similarly divided on this issue,139
presumably this decision of the Supreme Court has resolved the
matter. Where separate questions seek to establish one fact, or
relate to a single subject of inquiry, only one penalty for contempt
may be imposed for refusal to answer all.
The recent decision of Uphaus v. Wyman 140 involved another
facet of the same problem. Even though acknowledging that the
government may not cause repeated contempt citations by reiterating its questions, may the frustrated government officer await the
225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73 (1957).
Compare People v. Amarante, 100 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 92 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950), with In re
Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 745, 295 N.W. 483, 485 (1940), and In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454,
456, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
139 Compare United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953), and United
States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1952), and United States v. Yukio Abe, 95
F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950), with Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
140 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
136
137
138
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fulfillment of sentence for the first contempt by the contemnor,
and then greet him with the same question, threatening another
contempt conviction if he persists in his refusal? The cases have
not answered this perplexing question. In the Wyman case, the
defendant refused to answer certain questions before a one-man
state investigating committee. He was committed to jail for one
year. As the anniversary of his imprisonment approached, the
contemnor and the contemned both indicated that they would
repeat the incident. An onlooker could only hope that one would
relent. Neither did, and as his final act in office, the attorney general
moved for the unlimited confinement of the contemnor. Judge
Grant, who ordered the first commitment, denied the motion, and
Uphaus went free. Interestingly, the contempt of Uphaus was
termed civil throughout all of the proceedings, and it arose out
of a legislative investigation by an executive officer who, upon
encountering the contemnor' s refusal, went to the court for an
order, which resulted in a contempt of court conviction.
Analogy with past rationales would probably have supported
the second conviction. Good reason and mercy would not. Once
having suffered the punishment for his strong and sincere convictions, the individual ought not to be sacrificed again to overbearing
officialdom. The Yates decision adds weight to this latter attitude.
The double jeopardy problems indicated herein can be readily
resolved either by liberal construction of the policy of the double
jeopardy clause, or by the adoption of a statute covering the contempt problem as a whole, thus treating contempt no better, and
no worse, than other crimes.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in the Contempt Context
The fifth amendment directs that no one shall be forced to
testify against himself if his testimony would subject him to a
criminal prosecution. Though this privilege relates solely to
federal actions, all states have adopted it by their constitution,
statutes, or judicial decisions. 141 In the contempt context, problems may arise in one of two ways. First, an individual charged
with commission of a contempt may refuse to testify on the issue
of his contempt at the contempt proceeding. Secondly, one may
refuse to testify about some criminal, non-contempt matter, and
E.

141 See Kroner, Self-Incrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege, 60
L. REV. 816 (1960).
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this refusal itself may be considered a contempt.142 This would
include situations where the refusal would subject him to criminal
action either in the local or in another, foreign jurisdiction, and
is akin to the crossfire situation discussed in the double jeopardy
section. The first class of cases deals with the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination in contempt cases. The second
category concerns the convertibility into a contempt of the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in a non-contempt
case.
The fifth amendment's proscriptions are phrased in terms of
a "criminal case." Enough has been written about the important
ramifications of a judicial classification of a given contempt as
criminal or civil to warrant only its briefest mention again here.
Better reasoning dictates agreement with Wigmore that the policy
of the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the contempt situation.143 The possible legal consequences in the form
of punishments of fine or imprisonment are reason enough to
afford this constitutional protection. Wigmore concluded (and, it
is suggested, correctly) that distinctions between civil and criminal
contempts should not be the criteria for allowing the assertion
of the privilege in cases of such basic importance. The applicability of the privilege would better rest on its own policies and
logic.
Most states have held the state-established privilege applicable
to contempt cases. One California court stated that "it is fundamental that requiring a defendant in a criminal case to testify
violates his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,"
and that "it is likewise a violation of this privilege to compel a
defendant to testify in a contempt proceeding."144 The court resolved the classification problem in this manner:
"Contempt of court is a specific criminal offense ... punished
sometimes by indictment and sometimes in a summary proceeding . . . . In either mode . . . the adjudication . . . is
a conviction .... [T]he proceeding to punish . . . is in the
nature of a criminal prosecution. Its purpose is . . . to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court. It is a special
proceeding, criminal in character. . . ." 145
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,146 the Supreme Court
142
143
144.

145
146

See, e.g., United States v. DeLucia, 256 F.2d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 1958).
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2257, at 341 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
Killpatrick v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 146, 149, 314 P.2d 164, 166 (1957).
Ibid.
221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
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ruled, in a federal criminal contempt case, that the alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of the privilege, but it avoided
approval or rejection of the applicability of privilege to civil
contemnors. At least one writer has concluded that "a defendant
in a contempt case, either civil or criminal, is entitled to claim
the privilege against self-incrimination, and to require that the
contempt be proven against him by other witnesses ...." 147
In the category of cases where testimony would subject the
individual to incrimination for another crime in the same jurisdiction, the courts have allowed claims of the constitutional protection with respect to defenses to charges of both contempt of
court and Congress.148
With the tremendous increase in legislative investigations and
the adamant response of individuals in recent times to congressional exposure tactics, the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause has been invoked by many individuals as a shield from
committee harassment. Since the contempt power was then subject to judicial review, the federal courts' interpretation of the
fifth amendment was crucial to the resolution of this individuallegislative committee conflict. Originally, these cases turned on
procedural points such as whether the privilege was properly asserted, whether it was waived, what is incriminating, and whether
the witness was apprised of his rights or the committee's purpose.
The Supreme Court went far to extend the applicability of the
fifth amendment in such cases, reflecting a policy sympathetic to
the protection of individuals. Still, Professor Beck, in his study
of the congressional contempt power, concluded that the vitality
of the fifth amendment in congressional contempt cases was, as a
practical matter, limited.149 Its broad application, he concluded,
did not "presage any significant substantive limitations on the investigatory power," and its application carried "an aura of skepticism toward the innocence of the persons who sought recourse to
its protections." 150 Perhaps this provoked the gradual turn to the
first amendment as a surer protection from exposure and harass•
ment, as suggested in the section on that subject. In any event, a
review of some of the leading fifth amendment contempt cases is
147 Menick, The Privilege of Self-Incrimination as to Charges of Contempt, 14 ILL,
L. REv. 181, 187 (1919). (Emphasis added.)
148 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
149 BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 89-90 (1959).
150 Id. at 90.
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appropriate in understanding the background of the more recent
first amendment era.
The general rules of immunity and waiver were held to apply
to contempt cases as well as to any other offense.151 The rule
allowing assertion of the privilege where the testimony sought
would only indirectly tend to incriminate has also been applied
in contempt cases.152 The same rule applies to contempt cases
arising from the assertion of the privilege before grand juries. The
breadth of the protection of the privilege in these cases has been
liberally extended by the Supreme Court. Not only will the privilege against self-incrimination protect against answers that would
in themselves support a conviction, but also to those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a crime. 153 Any language reasonably indicating that
the privilege is raised will be sufficient to invoke its protection,154
and committees must clearly apprise individuals about the risk of
possible prosecution for contempt if they do not cooperate,155 in
order to be able later to secure a contempt conviction.
Susceptibility to a non-contempt criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction has not been accepted as a basis for protection
under the privilege. Therefore, refusal to answer questions, on the
ground that the answer would subject the 1-vitness to prosecution
for a crime in another jurisdiction, would constitute a contempt.
In 1892, the Supreme Court in broad language ruled that the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment precluded forced
incrimination in any criminal proceeding.156 "This provision," the
Court said, "must have a broad construction in favor of the right
which it was intended to secure."157 The Court held that the object of the self-incrimination clause was to insure that a person
could not be compelled to be a witness in any investigation where
his testimony tended to show that he had committed a crime. Immunity legislation cannot circumvent this constitutional privilege
151 See Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1955); United States v. Cohen, 101
F. Supp. 906, 907-08 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
152 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1951).
lo3 Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952) (per curiam), reversing 192 F.2d
201 (3d Cir. 1951); Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944 (per curiam), reversing 193
F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952); Greenberg v. United States, 341 U.S. 944 (per curiam), vacating
and remanding [in light of Hoffman v. United States] 187 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1951); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438
(3d Cir. 1952).
154 See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195-98 (1955).
155 See Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 223 (1955).
lli6 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
lli7 Id. at 562.
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unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect
as the privilege. The Court stated that "no statute which leaves
the party ... subject to prosecution after he answers the criminatting question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
privilege conferred by the Constitution...." 158 The Court held
that only a grant of absolute immunity would suffice to pre-empt
this constitutional privilege.159 This decision could have been literally construed to mean that immunity must be absolute in order to
do away with the self-incrimination privilege. However, the quoted
language has been restrictively interpreted, by resort to its peculiar
facts, to apply only within one sovereignty, and not to preclude
later prosecution in a different jurisdiction. Decisions since that
time have limited the immunity rule to apply only to prevent later
prosecution in the granting jurisdiction. In one case160 a man was
punished for contempt of a federal immigration inspector. He based
his refusal to respond to questions on the grounds that his answers
would expose him to federal and state prosecutions. The court of
appeals remanded, and instructed the lower federal court to advise
the witness which of his answers would incriminate him under
federal law, and then to allow him to refuse to answer these, free
from contempt sanctions. However, those answers which would
subject him to possible prosecution under state laws were not
covered by the privilege, and unless he purged his offense in this
respect, he could be punished for contempt.m This holding is
consistent with a long-noted and recently accented trend to reduce
the circumferential protection of the privilege in deference to the
independence of sister sovereigns in matters of criminal justice.
This policy was thoroughly treated in a recent article, where the
author properly concluded that such a restrictive policy cannot
avoid "enervating the principle embodied in the privilege." 1G2
However, the policy is not without respectable and persistent
authority.
The problem of self-incrimination, immunity, and the contempt power, as affected by the dual sovereignty concept, was
recently before the Supreme Court.163 A prisoner was called before
a federal grand jury and offered immunity with respect to questions which the federal government wanted him to answer. He
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938).
Id. at 750.
Kromer, supra note 141, at 838.
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
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refused, urging that his answers would subject him to state criminal prosecution. The district court found him in contempt of
court, sentenced him to two years imprisonment, and included a
sixty-day purge clause. 164 Both the district court and the court of
appeals justified the contempt conviction on the ground that
federal immunity need extend only to susceptibility to federal
prosecution, and this it did in the case before it. 165 The Supreme
Court was faced with the contention that older precedent,166 to
the effect that the immunity extended only to the granting sovereign, should be broadened to cover any later prosecution for
the particular crime in question by any sovereign. The Court
avoided the broad issue, and decided the case on the ground that
the particular immunity statute under scrutiny should be interpreted as covering both state and federal prosecution. 167 A dissent
noted the admixture of civil and criminal aspects in the lower
court's contempt citation and the absence of criminal procedural
safeguards.
In another case, which questioned a state court's contempt
conviction based on the defendant's claim that state immunity did
not protect him against later federal prosecution, the Supreme
Court adhered to the concept of federalist division between state
and national governments, and upheld the conviction. 168 A dissent
criticized the uncertain posture in which Supreme Court decisions
had left the matter, noting that the current status of the self-incrimination clause was such that "a person can be whipsawed
into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even
though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in the Constitution of each." 169 A related problem involves the hazardous
situation of a witness who is called before a state or federal agency,
and ordered to testify. He can testify himself into the jail of another sovereign, commit perjury, or remain silent and run the risk
of imprisonment by the immediate sovereign for contempt.
This view has been vigorously attacked, and has often prevailed only by a one-man majority of the Supreme Court. The
theory that the immediate and potential evils of compulsory selfdisclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of
164
165
166
167
168
169

In re Reina, 170 F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
United States v. Reina, 273 F.2d 234, 235 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931).
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 510 (1960).
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1958).
Id. at 385.
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crime seems more compelling than historical or academic arguments about the original intent of this clause.
This state-federal dichotomy is sometimes presented in situations where the work of one governmental agency• invades the
province of another. Such a problem arose in a typical case involving a Senate investigation of organized crime. Senator Kefauver's
committee questioned the defendant about his alleged violations
of state laws. The defendant's refusal to cooperate was based on
the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. He was adjudged
in contempt. A federal district court ruled that the defendant was
entitled to immunity against disclosures that might incriminate
him under state or federal laws,170 and, in addition, that the fifth
amendment precluded a federal contempt conviction where the
federal investigation overlapped into matters of state concern.171
The conclusion from these cases may be thus summarized.
In a contempt case, the privilege may be raised as a defense to
testifying where the testimony would subject the individual to
a criminal contempt citation. It would seem that the privilege
may be successfully raised in refusing to testify in order to avoid
a civil contempt charge as well. An individual may also refuse
to testify about matters which would subject him to a non-contempt criminal prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and this refusal will not be deemed a contempt. However, where testimony
would subject him to non-contempt criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction, his refusal on self-incrimination grounds will
be held contemptuous. Yet, where one inquiry solicits testimony
relating to incriminating incidents in two jurisdictions, defendant
may refuse to testify about any of the incidents, or demand absolute immunity from later prosecution in either jurisdiction.
The essence of the self-incrimination clause is that forcing
incriminatory evidence from an individual is unconscionable,
generally resulting in unreliable testimony, and that he should
therefore be constitutionally protected. This policy seems to be
dissipated by that trend of cases which allows prosecutions in a
second jurisdiction, based on evidence which would be unconstitutional if admitted in the jurisdiction wherein it was secured.
This kind of judicial reasoning allows individual rights to be subjected to circuitous prosecution tactics. If the self-incrimination
United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
Ibid. See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Licavoli, 102 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Aiuppa,
102 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952).
170
171
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clause is to be given more than ceremonious effect, the rule in
contempt cases should be brought in line with the rule which prevails within each separate jurisdiction. Otherwise, inter-governmental cooperation could emasculate the potency of this constitutional protection.
As with the double jeopardy situation, the self-incrimination
problem is aggravated in contempt cases. The problem of crossfire of prosecutions, as arising in search and seizure, double jeopardy and self-incrimination cases, is presently one of the most litigated and argued about problems concerning constitutional law
and political power. The interjection of the contempt power adds
another pressure to an already explosive situation, by aiming
punishment at the individual who, not knowing which way to
turn, elects to stand still.

F. Due Process of Law: Proof
"Summary punishment of contempt is concededly an exception to the requirements of Due Process. Necessity dictates the departure." 172
The due process clause is one which is doubly difficult to
define. It is as uncertain semantically as it is as a direction of legal
consequence. Its history has been one of redefinition according to
the dictates of changing times and attitudes. Generally, if vaguely,
it is a requirement for some minimum standard of comportment
in governmental proceedings equivalent with contemporary concepts of fairness and justness. The ~iscussion of the requirements
of notice, hearing and representation, in the sixth amendment
section to follow, establishes that many of the specific procedural
guarantees in that amendment have been deemed applicable to
the contempt situation, but under due process rationales.
In Cooke v. United States, 173 the Court wrote: "Due process
of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that
committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them.... [T]his includes the assistance of counsel . . . [and] the
right to call witnesses ...." 174 Indeed, several of these rights are
now incorporated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,175
172 Sacher v. United States,
173 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
17' Id. at 537.
175 FED. R. CRillr. P. 42(b).

343 U.S. 1, 36 (1952) (dissent).
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should there be any uncertainty in constitutional interpretation
with respect to the contempt situation. However, there are other
aspects of contempt procedures which still raise serious due process
questions.
One of these problems is the requirement of a certain quantum
of proof of a contempt. Civil wrongs are characteristically proved
by "a preponderance of evidence," while crimes demand proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." However, the Supreme Court has
again applied a variant formula to contempt cases, and, likening
civil contempt to fraud, has called for a requirement of "clear and
convincing evidence"-exceeding a mere preponderance,176 but
something less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test of criminal cases. In the case of criminal contempts, proof beyond areasonable doubt is required. 177 These two criteria have occasionally
been applied by federal courts, which have been astute about the
rules but hopelessly confused about the proper classification of the
contempt.178 Again, classification of a contempt is the key to an
appropriate decision.
In a recent case, McPhaul v. United States,1 70 the Supreme
Court dealt with this problem. The Court was called upon to review a conviction for contempt of a congressional committee. The
defendant asserted that there was insufficient proof that subpoenaed
records of the Civil Rights Congress (an organization alleged to be
subversive) were relevant to the committee's inquiry, in existence
or in his possession and control. The trial court refused to instruct
the jury that they must find these three facts to be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court instructed the jury to ignore
these facts because if the defendant had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records he should have stated the reason for noncompliance with the subpoena,180 thus giving the defendant the
responsibility of coming forward with exculpatory evidence. On
certiorari, the majority of the Supreme Court, following certain
past decisions, 181 upheld the contempt conviction. Relying on
analogous precedent that records kept in a representative rather
than a personal capacity are not subject to the personal privilege
Oriel v. Russel, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929).
See Nilva v. United States, 227 F.2d 74, 80 (8th Cir. 1955), afj'd in part and sentence vacated, 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
178 See Fox v. Capitol Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938).
110 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
180 Id. at 379.
181 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 332-33 (1950); Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U.S.
459, 465 (1933).
176
177

1962]

THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT

329

against self-incrimination,182 as well as the primacy of the House
of Representatives' committee work, Mr. Justice Whittaker, for
the majority, agreed that the defendant should have proved part
of the Government's case against himself by cooperating in the
gathering of evidence for his own future conviction. The Chief
Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented on the
ground that the majority's decision "marks such a departure from
the accepted procedure designed to protect accused people from
public passion and overbearing officials."183 The presumption of
innocence is shifted by giving such a defendant the burden of
proof on the issue of the willfulness of his refusal.
This point had been recognized in an earlier federal case.184
Dealing with similar facts, the second circuit overruled a contempt
conviction, pointing out that "the defendant can here legally be
jailed only for a contempt in failing to produce the sought-after
books when they are fairly shown to be presently within his power
and control. He cannot legally be jailed for contempt for invoking
his constitutionally protected privilege not to be a witness against
himself." 185 Admonishing that this case was a step backward, the
minority in the McPhaul case warned: " ... when it comes to criminal prosecutions, the Government must tum square comers. If
Congress desires to have the judiciary adjudge a man guilty for
failure to produce documents, the prosecution should be required
to prove that the man ... had the power to produce them." 186
The McPhaul case, though turning on what appears to be a
narrow question of statutory interpretation, underscored a very
basic concomitant of the exercise of the contempt power: the constant tug between governmental power and individual freedom, a
philosophical and political problem recurring again and again in
the garb of legal decisions in contempt cases. Also, the case above
deviates from the past federal court treatment of this problem. As
far back as 1894 one federal judge wrote: "Accusations for contempt must be supported by evidence sufficient to convince the
mind of the trior, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the actual guilt
of the accused, and every element of the offense...." 187
Yet, where a direct criminal contempt is committed, the defendant may be convicted upon the sworn statement of the judge
182
183
184
185
186
187

See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 383 (1960) (dissent).
United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).
Id. at 662.
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 387 (1960) (dissent).
United States v. Jose, 63 Fed. 951, 954 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1894).
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alone. 188 That statement, it was held, "imports absolute verity." 189
The import and gravity of this procedure is compounded by the
fact that the appellate courts have no record upon which to base
any review and therefore usually uphold the trial court's discretionary conduct.
All congressional contempts are now prosecuted pursuant to
a federal criminal statute,19O and as such require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, as with all other crimes. The general civilcriminal distinction is made concerning proof of contempts of
court. However, these otherwise clear situations are muddied by
interpretations such as that in the McPhaul case, and by odd classifications of contempts, as well as the special way of proving direct and civil contempts.
G. Due Process of Law: The Judge
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias. . . :•191
Another element of contempt procedures which would seem to
conflict with the due process protection is that whereby the judge
in a summary proceeding acts as judge, prosecutor, jury, and sentencer. Often he was personally the subject of the contempt. This
anomalous procedure derives from old English practices which
were not, and still are not, looked at askance. We have seen that
some of these practices have been proved to be based upon shaky
historical foundations. Strictly a product of the common-law system, this procedure is astonishing to those of the civil-law tradition.
It is astonishing to some common-law lawyers, as well. 192 Mr. Justice
Black wrote in the Green case:
"When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge,
jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge he is obviously
incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair and true
and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence of the accused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause. The defendant charged with criminal contempt is thus denied .. .
an indispensable element of the due process of law...." 193
188
189
190
191
102
10a

See Bowles v. United States, 50 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1931).
Ibid.
52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958).
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 280 (1948) (concurring opinion).
356 U.S. at 199.
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: "If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except
with the defendant's consent."194 A similar requirement was included in the Clayton Act,195 but in some existing contempt situations the judge is still not disqualified.
These provisions, though they apply only to indirect criminal
contempts, are eminently proper as far as they go. Federal rule 42
was based on the observations of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Cooke
v. United States. 196 There he noted the delicate balance which individual judges must strike in these cases between any impulse
toward reprisal, and such leniency as would injure the authority
of the court. He suggested substitution of another judge wherever
possible. Obviously concerned with this problem, Mr. Chief Justice Taft in an earlier opinion had suggested this inequity as another ground for extending the pardon power to cover contempt
convictions.197
The Supreme Court has often noted the human qualities of
judges by which they, as others, are subject to fallibilities and frailties such as anger, petulance, and even vengeance. Whether judges
are made of sterner stuff than other men, and are consequently
better able to withstand the natural evocations of human emotion,
has been debated many times and in many contexts.198 Although
variant opinions abound, and the problem may never be adequately resolved, it is not too heretical to suggest that a shift in
personnel is more calculated to insure fairness in the trial of contempt cases, and that the mere donning of judicial robes, and the
consciousness of an oath taken long ago, may succumb to more immediate emotional demands. In a case in which he discussed this
issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "These are subtle matters,
for they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." 199
Although one can never know the mental processes by which
a judge has acted, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the
impersonal authority of law is better guarded and applied by one
who is not himself personally involved in a given conflict. Perhaps.
Fro. R. CRillr. P. 42(b).
18 U .s.c. § 3691 (1958).
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
Ex parte Grossman, 267
See generally Goldfarb,
Ct!lebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 810
100 Offutt v. United States,
104
105
106
101
108

U.S. 87, 122 (1925).
Public Information, Criminal Trials, and the Cause
(1961).
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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the most striking example of this problem involves the New York
communist trials in 1949. There, Judge Medina and counsel for
the defense wrangled and fought for nine months during a heated,
protracted trial in a celebrated political atmosphere. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Medina summarily sentenced his contemnors to six months imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld
the conviction,200 but Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissent in
which he deplored the trial judge's conduct.201 He included in his
opinion an appendix of quotations from the trial record which indicated the open hostility and distaste which the judge and contemnors had for one another. It would have taken godliness in that
case for the judge to have acted impartially and with proper detachment. Several of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's brethren felt that
Judge Medina had shown somewhat less than that.
Greater expansion on the demerits of judging a cause in which
one is personally interested begs the very obvious. The axiom that
no man should judge his own cause was one early accepted in
American law,202 and with good reason. This was later applied so
that a "direct, pecuniary interest" 203 would preclude judicial action. Professor Cahn recently noted the anomalous position which
would have a wealthy judge disqualified on the basis of a minor
or remote pecuniary interest in a cause before his court, while allowing him to decide a case which involved matters of the deepest,
most profound effect on his emotional attachments.204 Not only
would his interest be likely to affect the issue of innocence or guilt
of the contemnor, but it might also bear on the sentence exacted
as punishment for the contempt.205 The due process inhibition on
judges who are interested in proceedings applies to state officers
as well, by application of the fourteenth amendment.206
Still the Supreme Court has not gone as far as it could. It has
not ruled that as a matter of due process of law a judge cannot sit
in a case in which he is personally affected. It intimated so in Offutt
v. United ·states,207 but that decision was based on the Court's
supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. l, 14 (1952).
Id. at 30 (dissent). See also Madnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir.
1951); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1950).
202 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
203 Id. at 535. See Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 396, 397, 91 Eng. Rep. 343, 344 (K.B.
1699). See also Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611 (1947).
204 Address by Edmond Cahn, New York University Law School, November 1960.
205 Cf. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (dissent).
206 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (dissent).
201 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
200
201
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the federal courts-not on due process grounds. This leaves those
judges who are so disposed to distinguish what could have established a correct rule. 208
The Supreme Court has upheld a summary conviction for a
direct contempt which arose out of an altercation between a trial
judge and defense counsel in a case before that judge.209 Recognizing the difficulty appellate courts have in reviewing such cases, yet
upholding the conviction, the majority of the Court agreed: "In
a case of this type the transcript of the record cannot convey to us
the complete picture of the courtroom scene. It does not depict
such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking,
bearing, and attitude. . . ." 210 Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the
majority opinion deprived the defendant of his constitutional right
of freedom of speech; Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented as
well, but on due process grounds.
Of all the complaints about the summariness of contempt procedures, the argument against having an insulted or at least interested judge preside over the proceedings which adjudge and
punish the misconduct requires the least support. Its moral and
reasonable sense should not be open to legal distinction. Contempt
is the only instance where such an anomalous practice occurs,
though there is less reason there than in any other case. This injustice is already recognized in judicial decisions and by legislation. To the extent that this view does not presently prevail, relief
should be afforded.

VI.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment is not the only
aspect of that constitutional provision which is pertinent to a review of contempt practices. The full text of the sixth amendment
reads:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
208
200
210

Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (dissent).
Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 160, 161 (1949).
Id. at 161.
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A. Venue
In addition to the issue of whether contempt proceedings are
criminal prosecutions and as such merit jury trials (which has already been discussed), the following section of the sixth amendment, raising problems of venue, is also noteworthy. Before determining where the "crime" was committed the decision-maker is
initially belabored with the recurrent problem of whether contempt is a crime, as envisioned by that section. If it is not, of course,
there is no sixth amendment venue issue. Assuming that it is, as
good sense and reason would dictate, the venue problem may, in
a given case, be one of constitutional magnitude.
In 1924 the Supreme Court addresssed itself to the problem of
ascertaining the proper venue for a contempt proceeding.211 The
defendants had violated a court decree of one district court by
contumacious conduct in another district. At the trial, an objection
to the contempt jurisdiction of the first court was made on the
ground of the sixth amendment's direction that crimes be tried in
the district where they are committed. The Court held that contempts are sui generis, not "criminal prosecutions" within the sixth
amendment, and that the defendants' conviction was therefore
proper.212 This authority has been followed213 on the theory that
the court whose order was disobeyed would not have the power
to punish the offense if a contempt had to be tried where the act
was committed.214 Federal statutes provide that civil actions will
be tried only in a judicial district where all defendants reside,215
subject to certain qualifications not important to this discussion.
The venue provision of the sixth amendment is now embodied in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well. 216 These are
logical rules since in both civil and criminal contempts the wrong
which is committed is directly or indirectly one to the court controlling the main action. In cases of contempt by publication these
rules could become awkward. Take, for example, the hypothetical
case of a California newspaper which publishes a contemptuous
article about a pending New York proceeding. The New York
court, having plenary jurisdiction over the subject matter, must
Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924).
Id. at 103.
See Sullivan v. United States, 4 F.2d 100, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1925); Mccourtney v.
United States, 291 Fed. 497, 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 714 (1923); Dunham v.
United States, 289 Fed. 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1923).
214 See Steers v. United States, 297 Fed. 116, 118. (8th Cir. 1924).
215 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) (1958).
216 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 18.
211
212
213
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have the controlling power elsewhere as well. The contempt is to
the New York court, although it might seem that the offensive act
really took place in Califomia. 217 This problem has arisen most
often in cases involving injunctions, where court orders were violated in different districts from that of the court which issued the
order. The decisions have uniformly upheld the power of the first
court to deal with the contempt. It was stated in Dunham v. United
States:
"A proceeding for contempt springs out of a litigation instituted in a particular court. Its principal object is to secure
obedience to the orders of that court, by punishing as a contempt disobedience thereof. It is the court whose judgment
or order has been defied which must try the contempt and
pronounce judgment.... If the place of the trial for a criminal contempt must be in the district where the acts constituting it were committed, then where such acts were committed
in a different district than that of the court whose order has
been contemned, such court would be powerless to deal punitively with the violation of its injunctive orders, and the trial
and punishment of such contempt would have to be by a different court than that whose order had been defied. This
would clearly be an alteration of the entire idea of a contempt,
and in derogation of the power of a court to deal with violators of its orders." 218
The principal policy of the venue section of the sixth amendment is to guarantee that a person charged with the commission of
a crime will be tried by his neighbors who are familiar with the
factual setting, rather than by strangers unappreciative of local
problems, customs and values. This central idea is maintained in
the contempt venue situation, though for slightly different reasons.
Since a contempt conviction is designed to punish an act's ramifications (like judicial indignity or inconvenience) rather than the
act itself (such as writing a letter to a judge, or failing to produce a book), it is sensible to conclude that the wrong took place
where the particular ramification resulted, and not where the act
which initiated that result was committed. A jury composed of
residents of the area in which the affected court presided would be
attuned to the problems presented by the case, and aware of the
effect of the offense.
217 Sec Sullivan v. United States, 4 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1925); Binkley v. United
States, 282 Fed. 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1922).
21s 289 Fed. 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1923).
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B. Speedy Trial
The first section of the sixth amendment also speaks about the
right to a "speedy trial." Is there some statute of limitations governing the contempt action? This problem was dealt with in
Gompers v. United States, 219 in which Mr. Justice Holmes wrote
an opinion which discussed the time limitations for contempt actions. Gompers defended himself on the ground that a general
statutory three-year time limitation for all non-capital offenses
implicitly barred his conviction for contempt. Mr. Justice Holmes
ruled that this statutory period was appropriate, and that formal
or rigid legal formulas for statutory interpretation were to be
avoided in such vital proceedings. Dismissing an attempt to avoid
the application of the statute or the Constitution by classifying
contempt as a sui generis "offense" not quite within the terms of
either, he wrote:
"[P]rovisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic
living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply
by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their
origin and the line of their growth. " 220

"Indeed," he continued, "the punishment of these offenses peculiarly needs to be speedy if it is to occur." 221 He said by way of
dictum that it was well that some rule be set out dealing with the
punishment of this crime, by the courts if not by the legislature.
"The power to punish for contempt must have some limit
in time, and in defining that limit we should have regard to
what has been the policy of the law from the foundation of
the Government. By analogy if not by enactment the limit is
three years." 222
Central to Holmes' thinking was his conviction that allowing an
action to be commenced at any time "would be utterly repugnant
to the genius of our laws.''223
In a later contempt case, Mr. Justice Douglas applied the threeyear statute of limitations held applicable by Mr. Justice Holmes,
and refined the holding by ruling that the statute began to run
219
220
221
222
22s

233 U.S. 604 (1914).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 612.
Ibid.
Id. at 613.
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from the time of the contemptuous act, and not from the time of
the last act by which the misbehavior was consummated.224 A fiveyear period of limitations for the commencement of criminal contempt actions is now guaranteed by a federal statute. 225 A sister
statute limits this time to one year in cases where the contemptuous
act also constitutes another crime.226
A civil contempt, by its very nature, becomes extinguished at
the termination of the action from which it arose.227 One court has
said that a district court which issues a compensation-oriented civil
contempt order may, as part of that remedial process, later commit
to prison where the order is not obeyed.228 However, acts violative
of a decree, and thereby contemptuous, but occurring after the
date of the final decree, can be punished as a contempt only so far
as they violate terms of that final decree. Another court has gone
farther and held that it is "within the power of the court to order
punishment for such [civil] contempts whenever the proof was
brought to its attention ... whenever it learns of acts which constitute such contempts." 229 This language seems unduly broad. Suppose the court learned of the contemptuous conduct long after it
was committed, and after the main action from which it arose was
completed. A civil contempt citation would not only violate the
policy against the revitalization of stale claims, but also would have
no relation to the purpose of civil contempt--coercing a certain
lawful result. In fact, this would seem to constitute a criminal contempt sanction.
C. Notice and Hearing
The general trial procedures which govern contempt proceedings are less than uniform, and depend again upon a prior classification of the particular contemptuous act-here, as direct or indirect.230 This distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court in 1888
in a case which involved a determination of the proper procedures
for a contempt committed in the presence of the court.231 The
Court first stated the proposition that proceedings without notice
224
225
226

Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1943).
18 u.s.c. § 3282 (1958).
18 u.s.c. § 3285 (1958).
227 Cf. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 379-80 (1st Cir. 1942).
22s Id. at 380.
229 Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 756 (1937).
230 Cf. Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 276-78 (1889).
2s1 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888).
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and hearing are not judicial, or worthy of respect. 232 It then expounded a special rule "of almost immemorial antiquity, and
universally acknowledged" 233-that notice and hearing are not
required, and imprisonment may immediately follow-vital to
personal liberty and ordered society, and applicable to direct contempts. The Court adopted this rule, which it felt was based on
precedent and necessity.
"[I]t is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England
and of this country, never supposed to be in conflict with the
liberty of the citizen, that for direct contempts committed in
the face of the court, ... the offender may, in its discretion,
be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without other proof .... [S]uch power,
although arbitrary in nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely
essential. . . ." 234
In a later case that same term,235 the Court articulated the rule
for indirect contempts. Citing the earlier opinion and its rule for
direct contempts, the court distinguished indirect contempts, holding that "whereas, in cases of misbehavior of which the judge
cannot have such personal knowledge, and is [only] informed
thereof ... the proper practice is ... to require the offender to
appear and show cause why he should not be punished." 236 At this
proceeding, the court held, the accused should be given notice of
the charges made, and an opportunity for explanation and defense.237 The particular manner of the proceeding, though, is a
matter for judicial regulation, so long as "it be without oppressiveness or unfaimess." 238 Thirty-six years later, the Supreme Court
ruled that these sixth amendment procedural rights were equally
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.239
"Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that
the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel,
232 Id. at 306.
233 Id. at 307.
234 Id. at 313.
235 Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
236 Id. at 277.
237 Id. at 279.
238 Ibid.
239 Cooke v. United States, 267

U.S. 517 (1925).
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if requested, and the right to call witnesses to gwe testimony. . . ."240
And so the sixth amendment's rights of notice, hearing and
counsel were held applicable to indirect contempts, though direct
contempts were still permitted to be treated summarily, in order
to avoid a feared demoralization of the court's authority. The balance again was judicially tipped in favor of judicial security and
efficiency over personal liberty and procedural safeguards.
The problem arose again in 1947.241 The Supreme Court was
called upon to review a contempt conviction arising out of a secret
one-man grand jury proceeding held pursuant to a Michigan statute. The court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the
fourteenth amendment's due process protection included such procedural rights as public trial, hearing, notice of charges, examination of witnesses, and representation by counsel. Although the
court was divided in its decision, the majority held that these procedural rights bound the states as well as the federal government,
even in criminal contempt cases.242
These rights are now covered by federal statute in most situations. For any contempt of Congress the accused is allowed all
rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. A similar situation also
exists with respect to an indirect criminal contempt of court. For
direct criminal contempt of court, or civil contempt of court,
exceptions to the otherwise general rule are made. It is suggested
that these exceptions are, as a matter of policy, unnecessary, and, as
a matter of law, unconstitutional. The reasons advanced in support
of these exceptional deprivations of procedural rights are precedent, judicial self-defense and respect, and efficiency. Any legal
proceeding, in which an individual may be imprisoned (whether
for a specified and limited time, or more especially where the duration is unlimited), or deprived of his property in a penal sense, as
is the case in all present contempt situations, should be treated as
a criminal prosecution as contemplated by the sixth amendment.
All rights warranted by that constitutional provision should be
available to the accused contemnor. Any loss to society through
judicial embarrassment, inconvenience, or delay would be far outweighed in social values by the added dignity of individual freedom and the greater respect which would derive from a system
240
241
242

Id. at 537.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Id. at 273•76.
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which consistently recognized these constitutional liberties. This
is the liberal essence of our constitutional government, of our
philosophy of the relation between men and law and government.

VII. THE

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
Mr. Justice Black's sweeping condemnation of contempt practices in the Green case also included an attack upon the open-end
sentencing procedure available in many contempt situations. He
wrote:
"[A]s the law now stands there are no limits on the punishment a judge can impose on a defendant whom he finds guilty
of contempt except for whatever remote restrictions exist in
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments or in the nebulous requirements of 'reasonableness' now promulgated by the majority." 243
And later in that opinion he noted:
"[I]ts subversive potential ... appears to be virtually unlimited. All the while the sentences imposed on those found guilty
of contempt have steadily mounted, until now they are even
imprisoned for years." 244
This constitutional provision has been infrequently applied
and strangely interpreted.245 The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights in 1688.
Thereafter, it appeared in early legal declarations in the United
States, and finally was adopted as a part of the eighth amendment
to the Constitution. All states have similar constitutional language.
Courts, though infrequently visited with eighth amendment issues,
have not always agreed upon its true meaning or application. Although there is common agreement that the original purpose of
this clause was to allay fears of excessive governmental intrusion
upon personal liberties by providing a constitutional check, modern courts are less than clear about its interpretation, specifically
regarding questions such as what is cruel, what is unusual, what
constitutes punishment, and whether civil sentences are covered.
243
244
245

356 U.S. 165, 200 (1957).
Id. at 208.
See generally Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961).
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The predominant view is that the clause is aimed only at preventing barbaric, torturous punishments.246 Modem interpretations have occasionally gone farther, holding that it could be used
to relieve sentences whose durations were cruel in proportion to
the wrongful act, as well as in the mode or nature of the punishment itself.247
The eighth amendment promises little shelter to the contemnor who feels that his sentence is onerous. First of all, there is
serious question about its applicability in civil contempt cases. The
clause speaks of punishments, and the argument can be made that
civil contempt sentences are remedial devices, not punitive sanctions. In a legal sense, punishments are imposed for the commission of crimes. In a literal sense, punishment is a penalty,
retributive suffering, pain or loss. Civil contempt sentences are
punishments in the latter sense, but not necessarily in the former.
Occasionally the point has been litigated. In a New York case,248
a husband was imprisoned for failing to pay alimony to his wife.
He had suffered :financially from the Depression, and his wife was
childless and earning her own living. After two years and seven
months in jail, he applied for discharge from imprisonment. The
court, facetiously nominating him "the senior inmate of the sheriff's alimony colony," released the contemnor, noting that the
state's cruel and u,nusual punishment provision need not be limited
to "barbarities," but should be construed as a "forward-looking
and progressive declaration of principle." 249 Critical of the rule
which would confine the merciful application of the clause to
criminal contempts while denying it in harsher civil contempt
cases, the court wrote:
"Under these sections if an intruder disturbs the serenity of
a courtroom . . . the limits of judicial displeasure are circumscribed by statute. . . . However, let a waspish woman
pluck the sleeve of the judicial gown ... and this temperate
restraint is immediately cast aside, and the delinquent spouse
faces the possibility of unending imprisonment. . . . This
carries the supposed rights of women to absurd . . . lengths.
[T]here are those who doubt the expediency of its extension
into a form of petticoat justice."250
Id. at 847.
Ibid.
248 Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
249 Id. at 793, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 804.
21,0 Id. at 794, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 805.
246
247
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The good sense of this reasoning has not prevailed. The cruel
and unusual punishment provision has generally been held relevant only to situations arising out of the more traditional criminal
punishments, and civil contempts have consistently been differentiated from this class of cases.
The New York newspapers have reported, with proper indignation, the confinement of an eighty-year-old woman for civil contempt of a surrogate court. She had languished in prison for over
three years before the same judge who committed her ordered her
release. At the time of this writing she is still in contempt of that
court, and conceivably could be sent back to prison. Her contempt
resulted more from her naivete and ignorance of probate proceedings than it involved any corruption of the administration of justice. The severity of the law of contempt upon little old ladies has
been dramatically frustrating to the courts of England, too. In
1886, a woman, unsuccessful in attempts to get legal title to some
houses and property to which she claimed ownership, had to be
enjoined from forcibly possessing them.251 When her endeavors
were not deterred, she was incarcerated for contempt until she
would conform to the court's order. She remained adamant, though
in jail. Two years later, an embarrassed court discharged her from
custody, lamenting their position and hopefully ordering her cooperation. In its opinion, the court voiced regret that this annoying, though not serious, offense was punishable by imprisonment
at all. 252
Mr. Justice Rutledge defined what he thought to be the mandate of the eighth amendment, in his dissent to United Mine
Workers v. United States.253 There, he wrote:
"The law has fixed standards for each remedy, and they are
... for damages in civil contempt the amount of injury proven
and no more ... for coercion, what may be required to bring
obedience and not more, whether by way of imprisonment or
fine; for punishment, what is not cruel and unusual or, in the
case of a fine, excessive within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition. " 254
The realities have not always coincided with his articulation of
policy.
In civil contempt cases there is often no relation between the
251
252
253
254

In re Maria Annie Davies, 21 Q.B.D. 236 (1888).
Id. at 239.
330 U.S. 258 (1947).
Id. at 377.
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sentence and the coercion necessary to compel obedience. In cases
where the contemnor does not cooperate on grounds of moral indignation or principle, or impossibility (as in some alimony cases),
there is no calculable relation between the punishment and the
goal sought. Unfortunately, this often results in harsh waiting-out
periods, with the prisoner remaining in jail indefinitely. Moreover, civil contempts are in fact sometimes civil in name only, entailing, in reality, criminal punishments.255
There is equal question about the realism of the Rutledge formula in criminal contempt cases. Most criminal contempt sentences
are something short of cruel or unusual, though they may at times
be viewed as harsh, more than necessary, or overly strict.
In the Green case the convicted Smith Act defendants were
given an additional sentence of three years' imprisonment for
"jumping bail" in contempt of a federal court order to appear for
sentencing. The maximum sentence under the bail-jumping statute
was five years.256 But indictment under that statute would have
guaranteed a jury trial before a disinterested judge. Such a severe
sentence (and at that the judge was limited only by his conscience)
is not unusual in contempt cases.
Another Smith Act defendant was found guilty of criminal
contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for four years.257 He
failed to obey a district court order to surrender, and was apprehended two years later. The second circuit considered this sentence
"well within a reasonable exercise of discretion by the trial judge,
obviously ... not violating the eighth amendment ...." 258
In United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co.259 the publishers
and editor of a local newspaper were fined 7,500 dollars for their
constructive contempt of a pending judicial proceeding. Their
offensive conduct consisted of no more than editorializing about
a disputed street railway franchise in the city of Toledo. Far more
vitriolic comments have gone unpunished since then because of
the Supreme Court's reluctance to include press comments within
the wording of the federal contempt statute.
In the sensational United States v. United Mine Workers case,260
255 Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
256 18
§ 3146 (1958).
257 United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545,

u.s.c.

546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 841

(1954).

Ibid.
220 Fed. 458, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1915), afj'd, 237 Fed. 986 (6th Cir. 1916), afj'd, 247
U.S. 407 (1918). The case was expressly overruled in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33
(1941).
260 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
258
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John L. Lewis, the famous union leader of the mine workers, was
fined 10,000 dollars and his union was fined 3,500,000 dollars for
contempt. Their contempt involved disobedience of a court order
restraining interference by the mine workers with temporary governmental operation of the mines during conciliation of a labormanagement dispute. The Supreme Court upheld Lewis' fine, but
reduced the union's to 700,000 dollars, conditioned upon its subsequent compliance with the same order. In a separate opinion,
Justices Black and Douglas criticized the excessive sentence. They
pointed out that the same interference during wartime would have
been governed by a 5,000 dollar maximum fine under the War
Labor Disputes Act. The equities in that case were compounded
by the fact that the defendants believed, in good faith, that they
were acting within their legal rights. Lawyers and legal scholars
have differed in their interpretations of many laws similar to the
one which gave rise to the contempt in the United Mine Workers
case, and of the sweepingly broad language of the contempt statute
itself. Even the Supreme Court has been unable to clarify this muddled area of the law.
Regardless of how onerous sentences for contempt may become,
present indications point to little solace from the eighth amendment's protections. This amendment was originally included in the
Constitution to protect citizens against those horrid and barbarous
punishments which the history of man had seen inflicted, and
which shock the conscience of civilized society.261 However, American courts have restrictively construed this potentially merciful
legal vehicle to the point where its utility is minimal. Capital
punishment by gas, hanging, and electrocution have been considered neither cruel nor unusual. Prolonged imprisonments, and
sometimes capital punishments have been imposed by less progressive states for relatively insignificant crimes. A three and a half
million dollar fine for contempt was based upon a persistent but
mistaken interpretation of the law. When John Kaspar, an extremist racist, flaunted a court order and attempted to provoke interference with the Supreme Court's segregation decision at Clinton
High School in Tennessee, he was sentenced to one year's imprisonment.262 The federal court which reviewed that contempt conviction disposed of the defense that the sentence violated the eighth
amendment. Punishments are cruel and unusual, the court held,
261
262

See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 437 (1890).
Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).

1962]

THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT

345

only where they are "so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of
justice."263 What criteria, or what sense of justice, the court did not
indicate. Another federal court has held that the words "cruel and
unusual" are to be considered in light of developing civilization,
not what was so in the eighteenth century.264 But courts have given
little attention to this constitutional problem, even philosophically. In a California case where policemen pumped a man's stomach to retrieve evidence later to be used against him at trial, the
Supreme Court could not muster approval. 265 They reversed the
conviction because these tactics were too close to the rack and screw
for American justice to tolerate. In discussing the meaning of due
process, the Court has spoken of those fundamental rights basic to
fair play upon which our concepts of justice are founded. And in
I 959, the Second Circuit, while recognizing that the unlimited contempt power exists, remanded a case for redetermination because,
among other things, a contempt sentence was so inordinately harsh
as to be onerous.266 There, a defendant was fined 1,500 dollars and
sentenced to imprisonment for six months. He had been summoned
in California to appear before a New York grand jury. He sought a
temporary adjournment but was refused. Though he failed to
appear on the date required, he did appear voluntarily soon thereafter. He offered to purge his contempt and testify before the grand
jury, but the government officials refused, and prosecuted the contempt instead. However, such sporadic decisions have not coalesced
to form a definite eighth amendment philosophy.
On another occasion the Supreme Court offered a vague formula for considering the cruel or unusual quality of punishments,
which sought to strike some balance in the relation between the
crime and the punishment.267 In discussing the cruel and unusual
punishment provision, one state court judge wrote:
"It is regarded as primarily relating to the kind and character
or method of punishment, referring to inhumane or barbarous
treatment or punishment unknown to the common law or
which has become obsolete with the progress of humanitarianism, rather than to the severity in the amount or duration. But
Ibid.
Ex parte Pickens, IOI F. Supp. 285, 288 (D. Alaska 1951).
265 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
~6 United States v. Desimone, 267 F.2d 741, 747-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
827 (1959).
267 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
263
264
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it would seem that most of the courts hold it covers that
too."2as
The examples presented in this section would indicate either that
the last sentence of this opinion is inaccurate, or that one individual's concept of what is excessive in amount is at odds with that
prevailing among many present authorities.
In a recent contempt case,269 a federal court sustained a fifteenmonth sentence on the ground that it was reasonable when viewed
in the light of other similar convictions of eighteen months,270 or
three and four years,271 and the Supreme Court upheld the decision. The lower federal courts have "considerable latitude" in sentencing for contempt.272 Compounded by the minimal trial record
in contempt proceedings, and the reluctance of appellate courts
to overturn the decisions of lower courts, this discretion is tantamount to total license. In the case above, an aggressive district
attorney asked the judge to mete out a substantial sentence, to
omit a standard clause by which the contemnor might purge his
offense, and to deny bail. The judge, in his discretion, did all
three.
In summary, for contempt of Congress there is a one-year maximum sentence; the eighth amendment would not prohibit this
severity, but might possibly apply in cases where successive convictions were sought for the same but repeated act of contumacy.
For certain specific contempts of federal courts, there are statutory
limitations. Many situations find the courts with unlimited powers.
Only three states have no statutory maximum on the quantum of
punishment permitted incident to an exercise of the contempt
power.273 Sixteen have a maximum for contempts committed outside of court, but none for direct contempts. Twenty-nine have
overall maximums. Nine have maximums of six months; one has
a three-month maximum; and the rest have thirty-day limitations.274
The cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Constitu268 Weber v. Commonwealth,

303 Ky. 56, 63, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
270 See Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 92 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 916 (1955).
271 See United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1957), afj'd, 356 U.S. 165 (1958);
United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 841 (1954);
United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
272 United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 1957), a!J'd, 359 U.S. 41 (1958).
273 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
274 See Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 998, 1000 n.18 (1956).
269

1962]

THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT

347

tion, though indicative of a policy against excessive sentencing
practices, in actuality operates only against barbarous, Draconian
punishments. While contempt sentencing practices do not fall into
this category, they may be viewed as more harsh, more extensive,
and aimed less at purposeful, judicious goals than they might be.
Some alleviation, at least, is deserved. The chances would appear
to be better that this relief will be arrived at through avenues other
than the eighth amendment. Courts may someday decide that current contempt practices improperly result in cruel punishments,
and the versatility of the Constitution, through the elastic powers
of judicial review, will then be brought into play.
Beyond this possibility, some trend can be sensed in recent years
in which contempt sentences have been increasingly limited by
statute. These legislative maximums have been realistic, and are
the best answer to this problem-for two reasons. A statutory maximum sentence apprises the potential contemnor of the likely consequences of his wrongful conduct before he acts. It would also
limit the power of judges to exaggerate the gravity of punishments
in cases where they might otherwise be so inclined. This is a far
clearer method of controlling sentencing powers than the vague,
varying, and often unusable protections of the eighth amendment,
or the equally impractical recourse to judicial interpretations of
excessiveness or unreasonableness.

VIII.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

The tenth amendment to the Constitution reads: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." The powers of the federal government were early
interpreted to include all those necessarily inferrable from specific
constitutional grants as well as the powers which were expressly
enumerated.275 These so-called implied powers have been the
source of heated political and social conflicts from earliest times.
One of the most volatile parts of the Constitution, touching sensitive areas of local chauvinism and power, the tenth amendment
has caused debate both concerning the respective content of state
and federal powers, and relating to conflicts between those same
powers. Which powers are to be left solely to the control of the
states, and which to the national government? And how does one
271'i

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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determine which should prevail where both, properly asserted,
conflict? Into this struggle the contempt power enters only indirectly and infrequently. When it does, it provokes deep and difficult basic problems with respect to the balance of government
powers.
In re Comingore 276 illustrates the basic problem. In that case
a collector of internal revenue for the federal government was
questioned as a witness in a state civil proceeding. He refused to
provide certain information attempted to be elicited from him, on
the ground that a regulation of the Treasury Department forbade
such disclosure. He was fined and imprisoned for contempt, and
brought habeas corpus proceedings. The federal district court held
that the state had no authority over property or archives of the
United States Government. The state imposition through the
medium of a contempt proceeding was therefore improper. The
court further held that though this might not be the case with
respect to the federal government's access to public records of
states, or vice versa, there was no corresponding right to demand
information about non-public matters.277 If the latter pertained
to internal governmental conduct which policy demanded be kept
from the public, no right of inspection would exist. "The state has
neither occasion nor right to call upon the United States nor her
officers for reports made under the administration of its laws in
order to enforce the collection of state revenue. Nor would the
United States have the right to call upon the state." 278
Occasionally, the issue has recurred in the context of congressional contempt cases.279 In United States v. Owlett280 the
power of a state committee to investigate intrastate work of the
Federal Works Progress Administration in that state was questioned. The United States objected on the ground that this interference would obstruct proper governmental functions. The
federal court enjoined the disputed investigation, holding that it
was beyond the jurisdiction of the state, and an interference with
the established immunity of federal agencies from state control.281
Since this was not a proper area for state legislative action, an
injunction against the state was issued.
96 Fed. 552 (D. Ky. 1899), afj'd sub nom. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 561. See also Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
279 See In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959). See also Comment, 70 YALE
L.J. 812 (1961).
280 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
281 Id. at 742.
276
277
278
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The recent conflict between the New York-New Jersey Port
Authority and the Geller House Judiciary Sub-Committee gave
to the problem some added notoriety.282 An officer of the Port
Authority, an interstate municipal agency created by a compact
between the two states, was subpoenaed to produce a voluminous
amount of the Authority's records before the House sub-committee. In obedience to orders of the governors of New York and
New Jersey he refused, and Congress cited him for contempt. One
of his defenses to the congressional contempt citation was that federal investigations into areas of state concern unconstitutionally
interfere with the federal system of government as exemplified by
the reservation clause of the tenth amendment. It had been suggested that "the theory that state documents are sacrosanct when
dealing with wholly internal matters was recently rejected.283 The
district court found Tobin guilty of contempt. The court of appeals reversed. The Port Authority case is now being appealed by
the Government. The tenth amendment issue was left unanswered
by the court of appeals decision. In the lower court opinion in
this case, Judge Youngdahl did attempt to reach this constitutional
issue. He wrote:
"If possible, attempt should be made to accommodate conflicting powers which overlap before it is decided that one
must yield absolutely to the other.... Honest and vigilant
administration of the balancing test by the courts can accomplish this result. The Federal system is itself the product
of accommodation between the need for central direction of
affairs affecting the entire nation and the desire to prevent
overcentralization . . . ." 284
As a final example, the contempt situation which arose from

the recent dispute in Mississippi between the governor of that
state and the federal courts and executive glaringly exemplifies
the emotional content of tenth amendment conflicts. Such cases
show both the versatility of the amendment, its adaptability to
thwart any federal action with which a state may disagree, as well
as the deep-felt and incendiary nature of the issue which the
amendment raises. 285
2s2 United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961), affd, .306 F.2d 270 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, .31 U.S.L. WEEK .3165 (U.S. Nov. 1.3, 1962).
283 Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 812, 817 (1961).
284 United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 612 (D.D.C. 1961).
285 It might have been an interesting paradox had Governor Barnett questioned the
constitutionality of contempt of court practices, and taken his case to the Supreme Court,
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The assertion of states' rights arguments to uphold civil liberties is itself interesting. Lately, a states' rights approach has
been frequently argued in defense of conservative causes, and in
conflict with certain libertarian objectives. Yet, it may be that
contempt convictions, arising out of federal interference with state
governmental bodies or agents, violate the tenth amendment, and
that the reverse might well be true unless some broader province
is given to the powers of the national government in conflicts
arising out of a federal system. The final decision should be doubly
interesting, as most issues arising from use of the contempt power
involve the rights of government versus individuals. Here, the
case is one of two sovereigns disputing powers, and attempting to
utilize the coercive contempt tool to prevail.

IX.

CONCLUSION

The matters which have been herein discussed indicate that the
legal treatment of the judicial contempt power has created a constitutional maze. Peculiar handling of a frequently-implemented
power has resulted in a unique body of law. The purpose of this
article was merely to point out some of the constitutional ramifications and anomalies incident to the utilization of this unusual
legal device. Answers or attitudes about particular problems have
been suggested or hinted at along the way. No complete analysis
was intended. Even so, selective consideration of the major constitutional problems suggests that some new and deep-cutting
changes should be wrought.
where the activists have as consistently criticized the denial of the right to trial by jury in
contempt cases as they have supported the right of Negroes to equal protection and due
process of law. The governor would also have had to appeal on the ground that his contempt was criminal, not civil, and that therefore he was entitled to trial by jury.

